Cohen and the Basic Structure Objection

Acta Politica 3:275-301 (2000)
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Abstract

G. A. Cohen’s discussion of the incentives argument for inequality has made an important contribution to our understanding of the normative theory of justice. The incentives argument is particularly difficult for egalitarians to rebut, yet Cohen seeks to show how egalitarians can mount a general defence against it. This paper argues that Cohen’s critique has so far been construed too narrowly, and that this has resulted in the mistaken impression that his critique stands or falls with the refutation of the so-called basic structure objection. I explain Cohen’s argument and the objection, and I explain why I think his critique is invulnerable to this objection if it is construed in a different way. I also point out that this critique, if construed this way, has much wider implications than is usually thought, applying not only to the incentives argument, or even to arguments about justice, but to most arguments in ideal theory.

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Christopher Woodard
Nottingham University

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