Hume and the phenomenology of agency

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):496-517 (2014)
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Some philosophers argue that Hume, given his theory of causation, is committed to an implausibly thin account of what it is like to act voluntarily. Others suggest, on the basis of his argument against free will, that Hume takes no more than an illusory feature of action to distinguish the experience of performing an act from the experience of merely observing an act. In this paper, I argue that Hume is committed to neither an unduly parsimonious nor a sceptical account of the phenomenology of agency

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Joshua M. Wood
University of California, Riverside


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