Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (1):89-106 (2016)
AbstractThe Demandingness Objection is the objection that a moral theory or principle is unacceptable because it asks more than we can reasonably expect. David Sobel, Shelley Kagan and Liam Murphy have each argued that the Demandingness Objection implicitly – and without justification – appeals to moral distinctions between different types of cost. I discuss three sets of cases each of which suggest that we implicitly assume some distinction between costs when applying the Demandingness Objection. We can explain each set of cases, but each set requires appeal to a separate dimension of the Demandingness Objection.
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