Explanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch's Analogy

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (4):226-235 (2016)
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In this note, I discuss David Enoch's influential deliberative indispensability argument for metanormative realism, and contend that the argument fails. In doing so, I uncover an important disanalogy between explanatory indispensability arguments and deliberative indispensability arguments, one that explains how we could accept the former without accepting the latter.

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Alex Worsnip
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill


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