Enforcing the Global Economic Order, Violating the Rights of the Poor, and Breaching Negative Duties? Pogge, Collective Agency, and Global Poverty

Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (2):334-370 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Thomas Pogge has argued, famously, that ‘we’ are violating the rights of the global poor insofar as we uphold an unjust international order which provides a legal and economic framework within which individuals and groups can and do deprive such individuals of their lives, liberty and property. I argue here that Pogge’s claim that we are violating a negative duty can only be made good on the basis of a substantive theory of collective action; and that it can only provide substantive ethical guidance when combined with an account of how collective action gives rise to forward-looking responsibility and/or accountability on an individual level. I consider accounts of these two topics given in work by Peter French and Christopher Kutz; and I argue that neither of them give Pogge what he needs. Although there is a sense in which 'we' can be said to be violating the rights of the worst off, the sense in which this is true does not generate any plausible action-guiding claims for individuals.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
WRIETG
Upload history
First archival date: 2017-10-03
Latest version: 2 (2018-04-20)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-10-03

Total views
304 ( #22,947 of 65,772 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #36,481 of 65,772 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.