The many (yet few) faces of deflationism

Philosophical Quarterly (263):362-382 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It's often said that according to deflationary theories of truth, truth is not a ‘substantial’ property. While this is a fine slogan, it is far from transparent what deflationists mean (or ought to mean) in saying that truth is ‘insubstantial’. Focusing so intently upon the concept of truth and the word ‘true’, I argue, deflationists and their critics have been insufficiently attentive to a host of metaphysical complexities that arise for deflationists in connection with the property of truth. My aim is to correct several misunderstandings as to what deflationists are after here—including some harboured by deflationists themselves—and to offer an account of the commitments about truth's nature that they ought to undertake. In developing this account, I focus particularly upon the issue of what metaphysics of truth a Horwichian minimalist ought to adopt.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
WYATMF
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-02-05
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Meaning.Horwich, Paul
Realism and Truth.Devitt, Michael
Naturalness.Dorr, Cian & Hawthorne, John

View all 44 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-02-04

Total views
184 ( #13,922 of 37,286 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #19,346 of 37,286 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.