Skeptical Theism, Abductive Atheology, and Theory Versioning

In Trent Dougherty & Justin McBrayer (eds.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press. (2014)
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Abstract
What we call “the evidential argument from evil” is not one argument but a family of them, originating (perhaps) in the 1979 formulation of William Rowe. Wykstra’s early versions of skeptical theism emerged in response to Rowe’s evidential arguments. But what sufficed as a response to Rowe may not suffice against later more sophisticated versions of the problem of evil—in particular, those along the lines pioneered by Paul Draper. Our chief aim here is to make an earlier version of skeptical theism more responsive to the type abductive atheology pioneered by Draper. In particular, we suggest a moderate form of skeptical theism may be able to resist Draper’s abductive atheology.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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