Kripkean Theory of Reference: A Cognitive way,

Jadavpur Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):89-101 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper is an attempt to present a Kripkean (Causal) picture of Reference where the cognitive content in fixing reference plays a vital role. It also points out that Kripke is not a pure causal theorist. By introducing Thomas Kuhn and his theory on vulnerability of the rigid designation, I have shown that there is a danger for causal theory of reference. However Kuhn’s argument fails to have an impact if a Knowledge aspect is augmented to Kripkean theory of reference. This new causal theory of reference preserves the truth of the referential term in spite of the vulnerability of the rigid designation and problem of reference change. It can also adequately answer the question of theoretical terms reference failure.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
XALKTO
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-08-29
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-08-29

Total views
59 ( #52,300 of 2,445,937 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #48,739 of 2,445,937 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.