Thomas Reid and some regress arguments

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 88 (1):54-81 (2006)
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This paper reconstructs Reid 's responses to regress arguments against the possibility of free will, highlighting the role played by long-term decisions in the explanation of paradigmatic free actions on Reid 's account. In addition to reconstructing Reid 's response to the two versions of the regress argument that he explicitly discusses, I also construct a Reidian response to Galen Strawson's contemporary version of the regress argument. The depth of Reid 's position is most apparent in the resources it provides for responding to this sophisticated articulation of a traditional argument against freedom of the will.

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Christopher Yeomans
Purdue University


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