Is there a plural object?

In Donal Baxter & Aaron Cotnoir (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract
A plurality or plural object is a single object that is also many, and pluralitism is the thesis that there is such an object. This paper argues that pluralitism and closely related theses (e.g., the many-one identity thesis and the composition as identity thesis) violate logic. To do so, it formulates an approach to the logic and semantics of plural constructions that results in plural logic and relates treatments of plural constructions to accounts of natural number. And it gives a critical examination of Frege’s views of numbers and plural constructions, and sketches the view of plural constructions as devices for talking about the many (as such), and an account of natural numbers as properties of a special kind, plural properties.
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
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2013-05-05

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