A Critical Review for the Possibility of Science without ‘Eppue Si Muove’: From Thomas Kuhn’s Theory of Science to Psychology of Science

ViraVerita 9 (May, 2019):48-73 (2019)
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The theory of science that Thomas Kuhn built in the Structure of Scientific Revolutions was considered as a hypothetical framework in this study. Since the publication of the work, many questions have arisen that call for a psychology of science. These questions are moved to another dimension through the knowledge of the decision made within Galileo Affair, which occupies an important place in modern science, fundamentally arising from an epistemic struggle and emerging out of an unscientific base rather than the charge of unholiness. Abandoning the perspective which evaluates these questions within a historical process as a weak side of the Kuhnian theory of science, this study challenges the current approaches with an alternative approach. The epistemic complexity in the Kuhnian theory of science is an imperative complexity caused by human factors. From this perspective, there are potential questions for psychology of science as a field of study based on Kuhnian epistemology and it can be assumed that new problems may appear when the other epistemological questions which assumed as “answered” are reviewed in the scope of this study. The main thesis of this study is that psychology of science is possible as a valid and operationalizable research program based on Kuhnian theory of science.

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T. Erdem Yilmaz
Ankara University


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