Speciesism and Sentientism

Journal of Consciousness Studies 29 (3-4):205-228 (2022)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Many philosophers accept both of the following claims: (1) consciousness matters morally, and (2) species membership doesn’t matter morally. In other words, many reject speciesism but accept what we might call 'sentientism'. But do the reasons against speciesism yield analogous reasons against sentientism, just as the reasons against racism and sexism are thought to yield analogous reasons against speciesism? This paper argues that speciesism is disanalogous to sentientism (as well as racism and sexism). I make a case for the following asymmetry: (a) some non-humans clearly have interests, but (b) no non-conscious entities clearly have interests. This asymmetry, I argue, renders sentientism resistant to the standard argument against speciesism.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
YLESAS
Upload history
First archival date: 2021-12-20
Latest version: 2 (2022-05-05)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-12-20

Total views
255 ( #30,118 of 71,204 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
149 ( #3,997 of 71,204 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.