Modal skepticism and counterfactual knowledge

Philosophical Studies 162 (3):605-623 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Abstract   Timothy Williamson has recently proposed to undermine modal skepticism by appealing to the reducibility of modal to counterfactual logic ( Reducibility ). Central to Williamson’s strategy is the claim that use of the same non-deductive mode of inference ( counterfactual development , or CD ) whereby we typically arrive at knowledge of counterfactuals suffices for arriving at knowledge of metaphysical necessity via Reducibility. Granting Reducibility, I ask whether the use of CD plays any essential role in a Reducibility-based reply to two kinds of modal skepticism. I argue that its use is entirely dispensable, and that Reducibility makes available replies to modal skeptics which show certain propositions to be metaphysically necessary by deductive arguments from premises the modal skeptic accepts can be known. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-19 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9784-4 Authors Juhani Yli-Vakkuri, Wolfson College, Oxford University, Oxford, OX2 6UD UK Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
YLIMSA
Upload history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2016-09-19)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2011-07-29

Total views
404 ( #12,228 of 54,441 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #18,368 of 54,441 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.