New Hope for Non-Reductive Physicalism

In Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitget (eds.), Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium: Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences (2008)
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Abstract
Non-reductive physicalism is committed to two theses: first, that mental properties are ontologically autonomous, and second, that physicalism is true. Jaegwon Kim has argued that this view is unstable – to honor one thesis, one must abandon the other. In this paper, I present an account of property realization that addresses Kim’s criticism and that explains how the two theses are indeed comfortably compatible.
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