The Normativity of Intentionality

In Johann Marek & Maria Reicher (eds.), Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Experience and Analysis (2004)
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Davidson has been instrumental in dampening the prospect of reductively explaining the mind. The core of his arguments turn upon his insistence that contentful mental states, the bread and butter of folk psychology, have a “normative element.” In spite of its pivotal role, as well as its intrinsic interest, the concept is very poorly developed and understood. This paper attempts to discern four different strands of the normativity of intentionality and to spark a long overdue systematic examination of a fascinating and significant thesis.
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