Abstract

No matter how many words/gestures one uses to describe his/her qualia, I won't be able to know what it was like for him/her to experience his/her qualia. I know what it was like for me to experience my qualia, simply because I can remember what it was like for me to experience my qualia. So, to me, there is no evidence that anyone else can experience his/her qualia. So, one can't prove to others that he/she can experience his/her qualia. One can’t (use any words/gestures to) prove to others that he/she can experience his/her qualia. "What is it like to be a bat?" When I imagine what it is like to be a bat, I'm actually imagining that I am the bat. Or in other words, I’m imagining that the bat is me. When I imagine that a bat is me, I’m actually imagining that a homunculus is sitting inside the bat’s body. What does this mean? What is that homunculus? That homunculus is a “clone” of me! That homunculus is another “me”! So, when I imagine that a bat is me, I’m actually imagining that I am sitting inside the bat’s body. So, the question “What is it like to be a bat?” is actually equivalent to the question “What is it like to be me?” or the question “If I sit inside a bat’s body (and control/feel the bat’s body) as the bat itself, what is it like to be me (under that situation)?”. The question “What is it like to be me?” is actually equivalent to the question “If I sit inside a human’s body (and control/feel the human’s body) as the human himself, what is it like to be me (under that situation)?” or the question “If I sit inside my body (and control/feel my body) as myself, what is it like to be me (under that situation)?”. Regarding its usage, the term “qualia” is equivalent to “(subjective) feeling” and “(subjective) experience”. The term “qualia” draws our attention to the ontological question “What is the nature of (subjective) feeling/experience?”. The term “qualia” urges us to think about the ontological question “What is the nature of (subjective) feeling/experience?” endlessly.