Fool me once: Can indifference vindicate induction?

Episteme 15 (2):202-208 (2018)
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Abstract

Roger White (2015) sketches an ingenious new solution to the problem of induction. He argues from the principle of indifference for the conclusion that the world is more likely to be induction- friendly than induction-unfriendly. But there is reason to be skeptical about the proposed indifference-based vindication of induction. It can be shown that, in the crucial test cases White concentrates on, the assumption of indifference renders induction no more accurate than random guessing. After discussing this result, the paper explains why the indifference-based argument seemed so compelling, despite ultimately being unsound.

Author Profiles

Zach Barnett
University of Notre Dame
Han Li
Rutgers University - Camden

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