Rumfitt on truth-grounds, negation, and vagueness

Philosophical Studies 175 (8):2079-2089 (2018)
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Abstract
In The Boundary Stones of Thought, Rumfitt defends classical logic against challenges from intuitionistic mathematics and vagueness, using a semantics of pre-topologies on possibilities, and a topological semantics on predicates, respectively. These semantics are suggestive but the characterizations of negation face difficulties that may undermine their usefulness in Rumfitt’s project.
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Archival date: 2018-05-10
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True, Truer, Truest.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):47-70.

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