Normativity and the Metaphysics of Mind

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1–19 (2010)
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I consider the metaphysical consequences of the view that propositional attitudes have essential normative properties. I argue that realism should take a weak rather than a strong form. I argue that expressivism cannot get off the ground. And I argue that eliminativism is self-refuting
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The Normativity of Belief.McHugh, Conor & Whiting, Daniel

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