Some Emotions Play a Reasonable Role in Akratic Actions, Not a Rational Role

Paris: Atlantis Press 575:10-14 (2021)
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Abstract

According to Donald Davidson, an akratic action is opposed to the agent’s better judgment if the agent act freely and intentionally. Davidson says akratic actions are possible and all akratic actions are irrational. However, although akratic actions are possible, akratic actions could be rational. The reasons are that some of these actions are rational; these rational akratic actions are caused by some emotions sometimes, while some emotions cannot make akratic actions rational, including excessive negative emotions, recalcitrant emotions, etc. Therefore, it is reasonable to explain akratic actions caused by these emotions and these emotions not play a rational role in akratic actions.

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Yu Zhang
Jilin University

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