A compromise between reductionism and non-reductionism

In Carlos Gershenson, Diederik Aerts & Bruce Edmonds (eds.), Worldviews, Science, and Us: Philosophy and Complexity. World Scientific. pp. 285 (2007)
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Abstract
This paper investigates the seeming incompatibility of reductionism and non-reductionism in the context of complexity sciences. I review algorithmic information theory for this purpose. I offer two physical metaphors to form a better understanding of algorithmic complexity, and I briefly discuss its advantages, shortcomings and applications. Then, I revisit the non-reductionist approaches in philosophy of mind which are often arguments from ignorance to counter physicalism. A new approach called mild non-reductionism is proposed which reconciliates the necessities of acknowledging irreducibility found in complex systems, and maintaining physicalism.
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Mental Events.Davidson, Donald
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Jackson, Frank

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