A compromise between reductionism and non-reductionism

In Carlos Gershenson, Diederik Aerts & Bruce Edmonds (eds.), Worldviews, Science, and Us: Philosophy and Complexity. World Scientific. pp. 285 (2007)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper investigates the seeming incompatibility of reductionism and non-reductionism in the context of complexity sciences. I review algorithmic information theory for this purpose. I offer two physical metaphors to form a better understanding of algorithmic complexity, and I briefly discuss its advantages, shortcomings and applications. Then, I revisit the non-reductionist approaches in philosophy of mind which are often arguments from ignorance to counter physicalism. A new approach called mild non-reductionism is proposed which reconciliates the necessities of acknowledging irreducibility found in complex systems, and maintaining physicalism.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-03-03
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
492 ( #13,626 of 65,737 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #61,361 of 65,737 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.