Comprehension, Demonstration, and Accuracy in Aristotle

Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (1):29-48 (2020)
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Abstract

according to aristotle's posterior analytics, scientific expertise is composed of two different cognitive dispositions. Some propositions in the domain can be scientifically explained, which means that they are known by "demonstration", a deductive argument in which the premises are explanatory of the conclusion. Thus, the kind of cognition that apprehends those propositions is called "demonstrative knowledge".1 However, not all propositions in a scientific domain are demonstrable. Demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles, whose knowledge is called "comprehension".2 If the knowledge of all scientific propositions were...

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Breno Andrade Zuppolini
Universidade Federal de São Paulo

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