Searle on Analyticity, Necessity, and Proper Names

Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (2):109-136 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

My aim is to show that once we appreciate how Searle (1958) fills in the details of his account of proper names – which I will dub the presuppositional view – and how we might supplement it further, we are in for a twofold discovery. First, Searle’s account is crucially unlike the so-called cluster-of-descriptions view, which many philosophers take Searle to have held. Second, the presuppositional view he did hold is interesting, plausible, and worthy of serious reconsideration. The idea that Searle’s account is a largely Fregean interlude between the Fregean description theory of proper names and Kripke’s proposals presented in “Naming and Necessity” is in major ways a myth, a mythical chapter in how the story of 20th-century philosophy of language is often told.

Author's Profile

Zsofia Zvolenszky
Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-13

Downloads
717 (#10,341)

6 months
12 (#59,738)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?