Associative exportation

In Piotr Stalmaszczyk & Martin Hinton (eds.), Philosophical Approaches to Language and Communication Vol. 2. Berlin: Peter Lang. pp. 249-267 (2022)
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According to latitudinarianism, S’s belief that x is F is about x solely in virtue of S’s believing a proposition that ascribes F- ness to x. Saul Kripke (2011b) has recently objected to this view by arguing that it entails that S believes of arbitrary objects that they are F. In this paper I revisit Ernest Sosa’s (1995a, 1995b) notion of associative aboutness to put forward a novel account of mental reference, called ‘associative exportation,’ that evades the troublesome consequence pointed out by Kripke, while preserving the spirit of latitudinarianism. In particular, the proposed view: (1) does not invoke any form of acquaintance with the object of belief; (2) validates a weak reducibility thesis of de re belief to de dicto; (3) is compatible with the observation that our unreflective aboutness judgments are latitudinarian; (4) offers new insights about the notorious tallest- spy objection.

Author's Profile

Tomasz Zyglewicz
CUNY Graduate Center


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