We are pleased to release this edition of Ralph Johnson’s The Rise of Informal Logic as Volume 2 in the series Windsor Studies in Argumentation. This edition is a reprint of the previous Vale Press edition with some typographical errors and other minor mistakes corrected. The prime motive for gathering Ralph H. Johnson’s essays under one cover is their clear articulation of the goals, concerns and problems of the discipline of informal logic. To my knowledge all of the published articles, (...) even of the 1980s, are still in print. But some are obtainable only by special request of a journal back issue. Their availability, even their existence, is not nearly widely enough known, and this volume is dedicated to remedying that disservice to those currently working in the field of informal logic, critical thinking, argumentation, and practical reasoning. Three of these sixteen pieces appear here in print for the first time. The previously published pieces have appeared from 1980 to 1992 as chapters in collective works or as articles in journals, and these in turn published in Canada, USA, The Netherlands and Belgium. It is hoped that gathering this hitherto scattered material under one cover will contribute to a greater understanding of what informal logic is, and to an enhanced sense of the impact of Johnson’s ideas. A discipline of informal logic might exist today without the writings of Johnson and his frequent co-author, J. Anthony Blair. But it would almost certainly be quite different from what it actually is. (shrink)

This paper addresses the issue of the relationship between Ralph Johnson’s idea of dialectical tier and the critical scrutiny function in argument. We first give a concise articulation of the critical view of argument, and then probe into both the apparent similarities and deep discrepancies between the critical view of argument and Johnson’s views on the dialectical tier and manifest rationality. On that basis, we disprove the conjecture that the presence of a dialectical tier indicates that the thesis in argument (...) is critically established. However, we also urge to bridge together the critical view of argument and Johnson’s theory of argument, and thereby to make the dialectical tier critical in nature. We argue that this could be a promising proposal, and conclude with some remarks on exploring the critical dimension within our current study of argument. (shrink)

The first part of this essay argues that the specification of rationality operating in Manifest Rationality does not allow for the inclusion of the dialectical tier as a necessary component of a rational product. It next considers Perelman's conception of "reasonableness" as an alternative to Johnson's structural sense of rationality. Adopting a contextually rich conception of rationality, like that of Perelman, allows Johnson to insist that a rational product must consist of both an illative core and a dialectical tier.