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  1. (3 other versions)A Theory of Justice.John Rawls - unknown
    Since it appeared in 1971, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice has become a classic. The author has now revised the original edition to clear up a number of difficulties he and others have found in the original book. Rawls aims to express an essential part of the common core of the democratic tradition--justice as fairness--and to provide an alternative to utilitarianism, which had dominated the Anglo-Saxon tradition of political thought since the nineteenth century. Rawls substitutes the ideal of the (...)
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  • (5 other versions)The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.
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  • Impartial Reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Ethics 96 (3):604-619.
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  • A Theory of Justice: Original Edition.John Rawls - 2005 - Belknap Press.
    Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.
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  • Sidgwick and the Rationale for Rational Egoism.David Brink - 1992 - In Bart Schultz (ed.), Essays on Henry Sidgwick. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  • Moral Skepticism and Justification.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1996 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral knowledge?: new readings in moral epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Value and Agent-Relative Reasons.David McNaughton & Piers Rawling - 1995 - Utilitas 7 (1):31.
    In recent years the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons has been taken by many to play a key role in distinguishing deontology from consequentialism. It is central to all universalist consequentialist theories that value is determined impersonally; the real value of any state of affairs does not depend on the point of view of the agent. No reference, therefore, to the agent or to his or her position in the world need enter into a consequentialist understanding of what makes (...)
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  • Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics.Norman Daniels - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (5):256-282.
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  • Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
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  • The Possibility of Altruism.John Benson - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):82-83.
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  • Altruism, solipsism, and the objectivity of reasons.Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (3):374-402.
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  • (3 other versions)The Methods of Ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1907 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 30 (4):401-401.
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  • Agent-Neutrality, Consequentialism, Utilitarianism … A Terminological Note.John Skorupski - 1995 - Utilitas 7 (1):49.
    It seems common at the moment to make agent-neutrality a necessary condition of ‘consequentialism” and to hold that deontological ethics are agent-relative. This note argues that both these tendencies regrettably obscure useful terms and distinctions. It concludes by considering what it would be best, now, to mean by ‘utilitarianism” and making a proposal.
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