This paper analyzes the generation and function of hitherto ignored or misrepresented interfield theories , theories which bridge two fields of science. Interfield theories are likely to be generated when two fields share an interest in explaining different aspects of the same phenomenon and when background knowledge already exists relating the two fields. The interfield theory functions to provide a solution to a characteristic type of theoretical problem: how are the relations between fields to be explained? In solving this problem (...) the interfield theory may provide answers to questions which arise in one field but cannot be answered within it alone, may focus attention on domain items not previously considered important, and may predict new domain items for one or both fields. Implications of this analysis for the problems of reduction and the unity and progress of science are mentioned. (shrink)

Drawing on diverse historical cases, this paper describes and examines various aspects of a modality of scientific appraisal which has remained largely unexplored, theory pursuit. Specifically, it addresses the following issues: the epistemic and pragmatic commitments involved in theory pursuit, including how these differ from those characteristic of theory acceptance; how the research interests of scientists enter into their pursuit decisions; some of the strategies for the refinement and extension of a theory's empirical abilities which typify theory pursuit; and the (...) need to distinguish between individual and community rationality in contexts of pursuit. (shrink)

Several diagrams and tables from review articles during the Ox-Phos Controversy serve as an occasion to assess the nature of competition in models of theory choice in science. Many models follow "Super-Bowl" principles of polar, either-or, winner-take-all competition. A significant alternative highlighted by this episode, however, is the differentiation of domains. Incommensurability and the partial divergence of overlapping domains serve both as signals and context for shifting frameworks of competition. Appropriate strategies may thus help researchers diagnose the status of competition (...) and shape their research accordingly. (shrink)

In this article I explain why scientists cannot always resolve their disagreements about experiments even if they do not hold conflicting theoretical assumptions, and how incommensurability in experiments can occur even if experiments are not deeply encumbered by theoretical assumptions. On the basis of recent discoveries in cognitive psychology and an extended analysis of a historical case, I explore a cognitive mechanism that may generate incommensurability in experiment appraisal. I find that, because of the involvement of goal-derived categories, incommensurability in (...) experiments may result from the conflict of goals that scientists pursue in their researches, from the differences of goal-derived classification schemata that they employ in analyzing experiments, and from discrepancies between skills that they have developed in their practices. This account differs from the conventional interpretation of Kuhn’s thesis, which attributes the cause of incommensurability solely to theoretical differences. In the conclusion, I further discuss the implications of this new account of incommensurability for both philosophical and historical studies of science. (shrink)

I argue that normative epistemology, traditionally conceived, is inadequate, given its inability to prescribe procedures for responsible knowledge acquisition that are usefully relevant to the epistemic situations epistemologists find most important and interesting, notably, those arising in scientific research. For the sake of developing a more satisfactory approach, I have done an extensive case study of a biochemical research program directed to explaining how cells make ATP. Specifically, I analyzed the fine-structure of the evolution of this research program by tracing (...) the arguments and counterarguments regarding key empirical and conceptual aspects of the competing theories as they were presented in the literature during the 1950s and 1960s. My case study reveals the central role concepts play in structuring the processes of knowledge acquisition, the hypothetical and prescriptive dimensions to concept formation, and the concealment of the options and risks involved in concept formation as concepts become entrenched in descriptive discourses. In constrast to normative epistemologies that focus primarily on explaining how subjects' beliefs in uncontroversial empirical propositions can and should be responsibly justified, my account of epistemic responsibility specifically addresses the epistemic powers borne by historically evolving and inherently risky conceptual frameworks. As a result, my interpretations of truth and epistemic agency differ significantly from those typically employed by mainstream epistemologists. (shrink)