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  1. Comparing Phases of Skepticism in Al-Ghazālī and Descartes: Some First Meditations on Deliverance From Error.Omar Edward Moad - 2009 - Philosophy East and West 59 (1):pp. 88-101.
    Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī (1058–1111 c.e .) is well known, among other things, for his account, in al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl (Deliverance from error), of a struggle with philosophical skepticism that bears a striking resemblance to that described by Descartes in the Meditations . This essay aims to give a close comparative analysis of these respective accounts, and will concentrate solely on the processes of invoking or entertaining doubt that al-Ghazālī and Descartes describe, respectively. In the process some subtle differences between them (...)
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  • The Cartesian Circle.Willis Doney - 1955 - Journal of the History of Ideas 16 (1/4):324.
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  • Crisis and Certainty of Knowledge in Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) and Descartes (1596-1650).Tamara Albertini - 2005 - Philosophy East and West 55 (1):1-14.
    : In his autobiographical account, the Munqidh min al-Dalāl, al-Ghazālī reflects on his conversion from skepticism to faith. Previous scholarship has interpreted this text as an anticipation of Cartesian positions regarding epistemic certainty. Although the existing similarities between al-Ghazālī and Descartes are striking, the focus of the present essay lies on the different philosophical aims pursued by the two thinkers. It is thus argued that al-Ghazālī operates with a broader notion of the Self than Descartes, because it is inclusive of (...)
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  • The Cartesian Circle.Lynn E. Rose - 1965 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (1):80-89.
    This paper suggests that the appearance of circularity in descartes' arguments is due to a lack of precision in his statements of them, Rather than to any flaw in his reasoning. The clear and distinct perceptions presupposed in the demonstrations of the existence of God are not the same as those whose reliability depends upon the existence of god. He is presupposing the reliability only of those clear and distinct perceptions which are known through the light of nature and have (...)
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