- (5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.details
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(3 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.details
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Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.details
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Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access.Ned Block - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.details
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(1 other version)The information available in visual presentations.George Sperling - 1960 - Psychological Monographs 74:1-29.details
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Consciousness cannot be separated from function.Michael A. Cohen & Daniel C. Dennett - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364.details
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What Is Wrong with the No-Report Paradigm and How to Fix It.Ned Block - 2019 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 23 (12):1003-1013.details
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Rich conscious perception outside focal attention.Ned Block - 2014 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18 (9):445-447.details
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Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn't Show.Ian B. Phillips - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):381-411.details
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What is the Bandwidth of Perceptual Experience?Michael A. Cohen, Daniel C. Dennett & Nancy Kanwisher - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):324-335.details
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(1 other version)Two neural correlates of consciousness.Ned Block - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):46-52.details
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Introspection and subliminal perception.Thomas Zoega Ramsøy & Morten Overgaard - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):1-23.details
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Separate neural definitions of visual consciousness and visual attention: A case for phenomenal awareness.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2004 - Neural Networks 17 (5):861-872.details
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We See More Than We Can Report “Cost Free” Color Phenomenality Outside Focal Attention.Zohar Z. Bronfman, Noam Brezis, Hilla Jacobson & Marius Usher - 2014 - Psychological Science 25 (7):1394-1403.details
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Finessing the Bored Monkey Problem.Ned Block - 2020 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 24 (1):1-2.details
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The Fundamental Problem with No-Cognition Paradigms.Ian B. Phillips & Jorge Morales - 2020 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences:1-2.details
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Perceptual illusions in brief visual presentations.Vincent de Gardelle, Jérôme Sackur & Sid Kouider - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):569-577.details
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Do we still need phenomenal consciousness? Comment on Block.Sid Kouider, Jérôme Sackur & Vincent de Gardelle - 2012 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):140-141.details
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Windows of Integration Hypothesis Revisited.Rony Hirschhorn, Ofer Kahane, Inbal Gur-Arie, Nathan Faivre & Liad Mudrik - 2021 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 14.details
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