According to the bodily awareness thesis (BAT), awareness of one’s own body is a necessary condition for the acquisition and possession of concepts of primary qualities such as force and shape. I discuss two arguments for this thesis. The acquisition argument for BAT focuses on the role of bodily sensation and action in the acquisition of the concept of force. I suggest that this argument requires us to conceive of the content of sensation as both representational and non–conceptual. The objective (...) reality argument for BAT claims that awareness of one’s own body is an essential component of those experiences which are required for a proper grasp of concepts of primary qualities. I conclude by arguing, in opposition to Sartre and Merleau–Ponty, that there is no incoherence in the idea that one’s body is a thing among other things. (shrink)

Les acquis contemporains des sciences cognitives, mais aussi l'expérience spirituelle déposée dans la gnose sont, pour la phénoménologie, source d'un renouvellement inédit — à savoir, son tournant pratique, comme science méthodique pragmatique en première personne et comme praxis réglée d'examen de soi. Mais de là sciences cognitives et gnose métaphysique sortent également renouvelées. Phenomenology finds a new renewal in the contemporary findings of cognitive science and in the spiritual experience of gnosis. That is the practical turning point of phenomenology as (...) a pragmatic methodic science in first person and a ruled praxis of selfexamination. But both cognitive science and metaphysical gnosis become altered by this renewal of phenomenology. (shrink)