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  1. Who may carry out protective deterrence?By Michael Sprague - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):445–447.
    Anthony Ellis argues that institutional punishment occurs automatically in a way analogous to mechanical deterrents, and given that issuing real threats is justified for self-defence, institutional punishment, intended to protect society via deterrence, can be justified without violating the Kantian constraint against using persons as means only. But institutional punishments are not in fact executed automatically: they must be carried out by moral agents. Ellis fails to provide a basis for those agents to justify the performance of their legal duties.
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  • A deterrence theory of punishment.Anthony Ellis - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):337–351.
    I start from the presupposition that the use of force against another is justified only in self-defence or in defence of others against aggression. If so, the main work of justifying punishment must rely on its deterrent effect, since most punishments have no other significant self-defensive effect. It has often been objected to the deterrent justification of punishment that it commits us to using offenders unacceptably, and that it is unable to deliver acceptable limits on punishment. I describe a sort (...)
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  • (1 other version)The right to threaten and the right to punish.Warren Quinn - 1985 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (4):327-373.
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  • Who May Carry Out Protective Deterrence&quest.Michael Sprague - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):445-447.
    Anthony Ellis argues that institutional punishment occurs automatically in a way analogous to mechanical deterrents, and given that issuing real threats is justified for self-defence, institutional punishment, intended to protect society via deterrence, can be justified without violating the Kantian constraint against using persons as means only. But institutional punishments are not in fact executed automatically: they must be carried out by moral agents. Ellis fails to provide a basis for those agents to justify the performance of their legal duties.
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