It is widely accepted that electoral representative democracy is better—along a number of different normative dimensions—than any other alternative lawmaking political arrangement. It is not typically seen as much of a competition: it is also widely accepted that the only legitimate alternative to electoral representative democracy is some form of direct democracy, but direct democracy—we are told—would lead to bad policy. This article makes the case that there is a legitimate alternative system—one that uses lotteries, not elections, to select political (...) officials— that would be better than electoral representative democracy. (shrink)

This essay reclaims a political proceduralist vision of democracy as the best normative defense of democracy in contemporary politics. We distinguish this vision from three main approaches that are representative in the current academic debate: the epistemic conception of democracy as a process of truth seeking; the populist defense of democracy as a mobilizing politics that defies procedures; and the classical minimalist or Schumpeterian definition of democracy as a competitive method for selecting leaders.

It is generally believed that one argument advanced by Aristotle in favor of the political authority of the multitude is that large groups can make better decisions by pooling their knowledge than individuals or small groups can make alone. This is supported by two analogies, one apparently involving a “potluck dinner” and the other aesthetic judgment. This article suggests that that interpretation of Aristotle’s argument is implausible given the historical context and several features of the text. It argues that Aristotle’s (...) support for the rule of the multitude rested not on its superior knowledge but rather on his belief that the virtue of individuals can be aggregated and even amplified when they act collectively. This significantly alters our understanding of Aristotle’s political thought and presents a powerful alternative to the epistemic defenses of mass political activity popular today. (shrink)

Political theorists have recently emphasized the popular dimension of Aristotle’s political thought, and many have called attention to Aristotle’s assertion that certain multitudes should share in the city’s deliberations. In this article, I explore the “part of virtue and prudence” Aristotle believes necessary for a multitude to participate in political life. I argue, first, that military service helps citizens develop the “part of virtue” necessary for political participation and, second, that the “part of prudence” Aristotle has in mind is sunesis. (...) I argue, moreover, that military virtue helps citizens acquire sunesis and guides its exercise. Aristotle recognizes the limitations and potential dangers of military virtue and attempts to avoid these, in part by offering a new understanding of military virtue to offset the Spartan. Understanding the “part of virtue and prudence” citizens have helps understand their role in a polity but also points to how those citizens, and their regime, can be improved. (shrink)