Switch to: Citations

References in:

Corporate moral agency

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):279–291 (2006)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Why corporations are not morally responsible for anything they do.Manuel Velasquez - 1983 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 2 (3):1–18.
    Properly speaking, the corporation, considered as an entity distinct from its members, cannot be morally responsible for wrongful corporate acts. Setting aside (in this abstract) acts brought about through negligence or omissions, we may say that moral responsibility for an act attaches to that agent (or agents) in whom the act "originates" in this sense: (1) the agent formed the (mental) intention or plan to bring about that act (possibly with the help of others) and (2) the act was intentionally (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   109 citations  
  • The Corporation as a Moral Person.Peter French - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (3):207 - 215.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   249 citations  
  • Debunking Corporate Moral Responsibility.Manuel Velasquez - 2003 - Business Ethics Quarterly 13 (4):531-562.
    I address three topics. First, I argue that the issue of corporate moral responsibility is an important one for business ethics.Second, I examine a core argument for the claim that the corporate organization is a separate moral agent and show it is based on anunnoticed but elementary mistake deriving from the fallacy of division. Third, I examine the assumptions collectivists make about whatit means to say that organizations act and that they act intentionally and show that these assumptions are mistaken (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  • Peter French, corporate ethics and the wizard of oz.Michael J. Kerlin - 1997 - Journal of Business Ethics 16 (12-13):1431-1438.
    For more than two decades, Peter French has been arguing in books, articles and symposia that corporations are genuine actors in the moral universe. Like adult human beings, they can and should take moral responsibility for their actions and be held accountable by the other actors in this universe. I have always argued with my students that the position is both metaphysically incorrect and practically harmful. Now (1995) French has redeveloped his position through 380 pages in Corporate Ethics, probably the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • (1 other version)Shared intention.Michael E. Bratman - 1993 - Ethics 104 (1):97-113.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   288 citations  
  • (1 other version)Intentional action.Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):39-68.
    We shall formulate an analysis of the ordinary notion of intentional action that clarifies a commonsense distinction between intentional and nonintentional action. Our analysis will build on some typically neglected considerations about relations between lucky action and intentional action. It will highlight the often- overlooked role of evidential considerations in intentional action, thus identifying the key role of certain epistemological considerations in action theory. We shall also explain why some vagueness is indispensable in a characterization of intentional action as ordinarily (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   160 citations  
  • Corporate Moral Responsibility.Michael J. Phillips - 1995 - Business Ethics Quarterly 5 (3):555-576.
    The debate over corporate moral responsibility has become a fixture in business ethics research and teaching. Only rarely, however, does the sizable literature on that question consider whether the debate has important practical implications. This article examines that question from a corporate control perspective. After assuming corporate moral responsibility’s existence for purposes of argument, the article concludes that such responsibility makes a difference in cases where it is present but personal responsibility is absent. Then the article tries to identify the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • (1 other version)Intentional action.Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser - 1997 - In The philosophy of action. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations