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  1. Intentionality as a constituting condition for the own self—and other selves.Andreas Wohlschläger, Kai Engbert & Patrick Haggard - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):708-716.
    Introspectively, the awareness of actions includes the awareness of the intentions accompanying them. Therefore, the awareness of self-generated actions might be expected to differ from the awareness of other-generated actions to the extent that access to one's own and to other's intentions differs. However, we recently showed that the perceived onset times of self- vs. other-generated actions are similar, yet both are different from comparable events that are conceived as being generated by a machine. This similarity raises two interesting possibilities. (...)
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  • Intentionality as a constituting condition for the own self—and other selves.Andreas Wohlschläger, Kai Engbert & Patrick Haggard - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):708-716.
    Introspectively, the awareness of actions includes the awareness of the intentions accompanying them. Therefore, the awareness of self-generated actions might be expected to differ from the awareness of other-generated actions to the extent that access to one's own and to other's intentions differs. However, we recently showed that the perceived onset times of self- vs. other-generated actions are similar, yet both are different from comparable events that are conceived as being generated by a machine. This similarity raises two interesting possibilities. (...)
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  • Joint action: bodies and minds moving together.Natalie Sebanz, Harold Bekkering & Günther Knoblich - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):70-76.
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  • Illusion of sense of self-agency: discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences of actions modulates the sense of self-agency, but not the sense of self-ownership.Atsushi Sato & Asako Yasuda - 2005 - Cognition 94 (3):241-255.
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  • Action identity: Evidence from self-recognition, prediction, and coordination.Günther Knoblich & Rüdiger Flach - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):620-632.
    Prior research suggests that the action system is responsible for creating an immediate sense of self by determining whether certain sensations and perceptions are the result of one's own actions. In addition, it is assumed that declarative, episodic, or autobiographical memories create a temporally extended sense of self or some form of identity. In the present article, we review recent evidence suggesting that action (procedural) knowledge also forms part of a person's identity, an action identity, so to speak. Experiments that (...)
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  • The theory of event coding (TEC): A framework for perception and action planning.Bernhard Hommel, Jochen Müsseler, Gisa Aschersleben & Wolfgang Prinz - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):849-878.
    Traditional approaches to human information processing tend to deal with perception and action planning in isolation, so that an adequate account of the perception-action interface is still missing. On the perceptual side, the dominant cognitive view largely underestimates, and thus fails to account for, the impact of action-related processes on both the processing of perceptual information and on perceptual learning. On the action side, most approaches conceive of action planning as a mere continuation of stimulus processing, thus failing to account (...)
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  • Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.Shaun Gallagher - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.
    Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and its neurological underpinnings. Second, there is (...)
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  • Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will.Daniel M. Wegner & T. Wheatley - 1999 - American Psychologist 54:480-492.
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  • Vicarious Agency: Experiencing Control Over the Movements of Others.Daniel M. Wegner & Betsy Sparrow - unknown
    Participants watched themselves in a mirror while another person behind them, hidden from view, extended hands forward on each side where participants’ hands would normally appear. The hands performed a series of movements. When participants could hear instructions previewing each movement, they reported an enhanced feeling of controlling the hands. Hearing instructions for the movements also enhanced skin conductance responses when a rubber band was snapped on the other’s wrist after the movements. Such vicarious agency was not felt when the (...)
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