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In a recent article Paul Cartledge and Matt Edge argue that the modern republican tradition offers a useful framework for understanding the Athenian concept of freedom, and that within this framework the Athenians protected their freedoms without reference to a concept of rights. This paper agrees with both of these conclusions but identifies and corrects three assumptions behind Cartledge and Edge’s argument: that the only purpose of rights is to protect individual freedoms against the state; that rights have no place (...) |
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This is a comprehensive analysis of the idea of libertas and its conflicting uses in the political struggles of the late Roman Republic. By reconstructing Roman political thinking about liberty against the background of Classical and Hellenistic thought, it excavates two distinct intellectual traditions on the means allowing for the preservation and the loss of libertas. Considering the interplay of these traditions in the political debates of the first century BC, Dr Arena offers a significant reinterpretation of the political struggles (...) |
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In this article, I attempt to answer the famous analyses of Benjamin Constant and Isaiah Berlin that the Classical Athenian Democracy had no conception of negative, individual, freedom. I do this by excavating an Athenian democratic concept of individual liberty from Classical Athenian texts. I go on to show that, whilst this has notable links to the later neo-Classical idea of freedom (excavated by the work of Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit), there are also a number of important differences. This (...) |
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This article argues that, next to a certain intellectual tradition of Roman liberty, often labelled ‘neo-Roman’ or ‘Republican’, we should also take into account the existence of, at least, two other conceptions of liberty, which have so far remained occluded under the prominence of Cicero’s ideas and the appropriation of them by later thinkers. By analysing the debate in opposition and in favour of sumptuary laws enacted from the 3rd century bc onwards, the article identifies a first notion of liberty (...) |
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This paper challenges how Roman liberty has been conceived by neorepublican writers like Quentin Skinner, who have suggested that Romans were primarily concerned with the arbitrary use of power. It argues that Romans focused their attention more narrowly and concretely on arbitrary coercion, or immunity from the unpredictable and unjustified violence which they believed was endemic to life outside the shelter of the self-protecting Roman civitas. It concludes by suggesting that Roman views about liberty are closer to those of Judith (...) |
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I argue that an ambiguity exists between Philip Pettit's largely normative and Quentin Skinner's largely historical accounts of republican liberty. Historical republican liberty, as seen in Livy's narrative of the period following the expulsion of the Roman kings to the passage of the Licinian-Sextian laws, was largely defensive, in the form of the tribunate. Though republican liberty protected the plebeians from wanton patrician abuse, removing them from a formal dependence analogous to that of slave or child in Roman law, it (...) |
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