It has been argued by some that the present non-existence of future persons entails that whatever obligations we have towards them are not based on rights which they have or might come to have. This view is refuted. It is argued that the present non-existence of future persons is no impediment to the attribution of rights to them. It is also argued that, even if the present non-existence of future persons were an impediment to the attribution of rights to them, (...) the rights they will have when they come into existence constitute a constraint on present actions. Both arguments build on a suggestion of Joel Feinberg's. Next, three arguments are considered which, while they do not highlight the non-existence issue, are related to it. The view that the causal dependence, of (some) future people on present policies, erodes or weakens the claim that rights considerations should constrain our present actions concerning them, is considered and rejected. The view that future people can only have rights to what is available at the time at which these people come into existence is considered and rejected. So too is the view that the attribution of rights to future people involves, in virtue of resource scarcity, an unacceptable arbitrariness. (shrink)

The actions and decisions taken by the present generation will affect not only the welfare but also the composition of future generations. A number of authors have used this fact to bolster the conclusion that the present is only weakly obligated to provide for future welfare since in choosing between futures of poverty and abundance, we are not deciding the welfare of a well-defined group of future persons but instead deciding which set of potential persons – the poor or the (...) rich – will become actual. Provided that future generations have lives that are worth living, they will be grateful to us for bringing them into existence – or so the argument goes. In this paper, I argue that this position overlooks an important aspect of the intergenerational problem. We are obligated to provide for the actual children of today, who will in turn be obligated to provide for their children, and so forth from generation to generation. A chain of obligation is thus defined that stretches from the present into the indefinite future, and unless we ensure conditions favourable to the welfare of future generations, we wrong our existing children in the sense that they will be unable to fulfill their obligation to their children while enjoying a favourable way of life themselves. (shrink)

Steiner’s book is an engaging and challenging romp through important issues in rights theory, moral and economic reasoning, theories of freedom, and questions of justice. An Essay on Rights develops and connects themes pursued by Steiner in a series of articles written over the past two decades.

The paper considers the morality of nuclear energy development as it concerns future people, especially the creation of highly toxic nuclear wastes requiring long?term storage. On the basis of an example with many parallel moral features it is argued that the imposition of such costs and risks on the future is morally unacceptable. The paper goes on to examine in detail possible ways of escaping this conclusion, especially the escape route of denying that moral obligations of the appropriate type apply (...) to future people. The bulk of the paper comprises discussion of this philosophical issue, including many arguments against assigning obligations to the future drawn both from analyses of obligation and from features of the future such as uncertainty and indeterminacy. A further escape through appeal to moral conflict is also considered, and in particular two conflict arguments, the Poverty and Lights?going?out arguments are briefly discussed. Both these escape routes are rejected and it is concluded that if the same standards of behaviour are applied to the future as to the present, nuclear energy development is morally unacceptable. (shrink)

Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services.” I shall refer to the right postulated here as “the right to an adequate standard of living” or “The Right.”.

This paper considers a guardianship model for the legal representation of future generations. According to this model, national and international courts should be given the competence to appoint guardians for future generations, if agents who care about the welfare of posterity apply for the creation of a guardianship in relation to a dispute that can be resolved by the application of law. This reform would grant guardians of future people legal standing or locus standi before courts, that is, the right (...) to bring an action before a court of law for adjudication. Although the guardianship model faces several difficult theoretical and practical problems pertaining to the representation of different near and distant future generations, it is argued that this model – and certain other legal norms intended to protect future basic needs – can be justified on the basis of the principle of liberty. (shrink)

This is the second of two chapters on preference democracy. It points out that theories of liberal democracy necessarily require systematic responsiveness to popular wishes, in ways that make them fundamentally ‘preference‐respecting’, but that there are many different kinds of preferences and correspondingly many different ways of respecting them. Different models of democracy are better at providing certain sorts of respect for certain sorts of preferences than others, and which model of democracy liberal democrats want to adopt therefore depends on (...) which sorts of preferences they want to accord which sort of respect. The central claim of this chapter is that the author's preferred model of ‘democratic deliberation within’ is preference‐respecting in the right way, and that it therefore deserves a key role in any larger system of democratic accountability. The different sections of the chapter are: Respecting Preferences, Not Just Recording Them; Permissible Paternalism; Assessing Alternative Models of Preference‐Respecting Democracy; The Virtues of Sporadic Assessments: Preference‐Respecting Arguments for Indirect Democracy; and Combining ‘Democratic Deliberation Within’ and Trustee‐style Representative Democracy. (shrink)

It is widely believed that environmental conservation has to be guided by respect for the ‘rights’ of future generations. But it is argued in this chapter that it may not be plausible to think in terms of the ‘rights’ of future generations in general or their rights to any specific environmental assets. Future generations may well have rights when they come into existence, but these will only be rights that can be satisfied at the time. But ‘rights’ do not exhaust (...) the whole of morality, and future generations will certainly have interests, which means that we are under moral obligation to take account of them and of the effect that our environmental policies may have on them. Thus, the problem is to predict what the main interests of future generations will be and how to weigh them up against the interests of people alive today. It is argued that this approach will lead to a very different ranking of priorities among our moral obligations to future generations. (shrink)

In this article, we explore the implications of a Rawlsian theory for intergenerational issues. First, we confront Rawls's way of locating his `just savings' principle in his Theory of Justice with an alternative way of doing so. We argue that both sides of his intergenerational principle, as they apply to the accumulation phase and the steady-state stage, can be dealt with on the bases, respectively, of the principle of equal liberty (and its priority) and of the difference principle. We then (...) proceed by focusing on the implications of applying maximin to his steady-state stage. One central claim is that, in principle, Rawlsians should consider not only generational dissavings, but also generational savings, as unfair. This principle suffers a series of exceptions on which we focus in the fourth section of the article. In some cases, growth can be maximin compatible. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Enviornment 6.2 (2001) 114-118 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Child versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law Child versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law. Melinda A. Roberts. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. Pp. 235. ISBN 0-8476-8901-8 (Paperback) This book will provide the reader with a systematic examination of some of the most difficult (...) philosophical issues involved in procreation, and most notably those raised by wrongful life claims and the non-identity problem. Can an action without which a given child would not even exist be simultaneously said to harm this very child? This is the key question addressed in this book. It is relevant not only to bioethicists, but also to those concerned with the possibility of harming members of future generations in general. The author proceeds with remarkable clarity in three steps. First, she unveils the core intuition and unfolds the key implications of what is standardly referred to as the person-affecting view. Second, she focuses on the now famous non-identity problem that is supposed to raise a serious challenge to the plausibility of the person-affecting view. Third, wrongful life and human cloning are taken as illustrations of the problem.The starting point is thus the person-affecting or personalist view. The author argues that what is at stake in such a view is not only a concern for [End Page 114] persons (as opposed to plants or stones), but also for definite persons. The core intuition that "what is bad must be bad for someone" (Derek Parfit) implies a comparison between two states of the same person. As she puts it, "the pairwise comparisons of worlds appealed to within personalism are always in respect of particular people" (6). This does not necessarily imply consequentialism, contrary to what Roberts claims (e.g., 1), at least if we understand the latter, for example, as Philip Pettit does. 1 Moreover, one may very well argue that what is at the heart of the person-affecting intuition is a sense that an action needs to be assessed on the basis of its effect on persons, which would not necessarily imply that such effects require a comparison between two states of the same person. Nevertheless, the extent to which a person-affecting conception--as defined by Roberts--will be in trouble depends on the extent to which comparisons between the same person's states cannot operate. This is precisely where to introduce the idea of a non-identity context, that is, a situation in which not committing an allegedly harmful act would or could also have meant the nonexistence of the allegedly harmed person. For example, had a medical doctor not committed this preconceptional diagnostic mistake (or a father taken a slower or faster means of transportation to come back home), this child would or could not have existed. Can we thus say that the practitioner harmed the child who turned out to be heavily handicapped due, for example, to a genetically transmissible disease (or that the father harmed his child by leaving him with a very polluted environment due to his use of big cars as a means of transportation)?One key feature of Roberts's approach is that she restricts the scope of the non-identity problem to cases where not committing the allegedly harmful action would have made it impossible for this child to have existed ("two-alternative" cases) (26, 319, 325). This entails that whenever this very child could still have come to existence in the allegedly harmful action's absence, whatever the likelihood of such a coming to existence, we would fall outside a non-identity context ("three-alternative" cases) (27; 94-95). What matters to Roberts is whether or not the same child could have been born better than he is, not whether he would, as a matter of fact, have been born at all. The consequence is that in cases where the same child could have been born, say, unhandicapped, the author remains... (shrink)

Unprecedented advances in medicine, genetic engineering, and demographic forecasting raise new questions that strain the categories and assumptions of traditional ethical theories. Heyd's approach resolves many paradoxes in intergenerational justice, while offering a major test case for the profound problems of the limits of ethics and the nature of value.

Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services.” I shall refer to the right postulated here as “the right to an adequate standard of living” or “The Right.”.

Wrongful life is an action brought by a defective child who sues to recover for pecuniary or emotional damages suffered as a result of being conceived or born with deformities. In such cases, plaintiff alleges that the negligence of a responsible third party,1 such as physician, hospital, or medical laboratory, is the proximate cause of plaintiff's being born or conceived and thus being compelled to suffer the debilitating effects of a deformity. The child does not sue to recover for the (...) deformity, but rather it is claimed in such cases that the child's life is itself a wrong to the child; hence, the name wrongful life.The present essay explores how the language of rights enters into wrongful life suits and critically evaluates rights appeals in these cases. Philosophical analysis yields the result that the ascription of rights to plaintiffs in wrongful life suits entails consequences we are unwilling to accept. (shrink)

The distinction between a type and its tokens is auseful metaphysical distinction. In §1 it is explained what itis, and what it is not. Its importance and wide applicability inlinguistics, philosophy, science and everyday life are brieflysurveyed in §2. Whether types are universals is discussed in§3. §4 discusses some other suggestions for what types are,both generally and specifically. Is a type the sets of its tokens?What exactly is a word, a symphony, a species? §5 asks what atoken is. §6 considers (...) the relation between types and theirtokens. Do the type and all its tokens share the same properties? Mustall the tokens be alike in some or all respects? §7 explains someproblems for the view that types exist, and some problems for the viewthat they don’t. §8 elucidates a distinction often confused withthe type-token distinction, that between a type and anoccurrence of it. It also discusses some problems thatoccurrences might be thought to give rise to, and one way to resolvethem. (shrink)

The A. discusses conditions for the idea of obligations towards the dead, while simultaneously holding the view that dead people have ceased to exist in a morally relevant sense. He examines and rejects three «lateral» strategies (Callahan, Wellman, Partridge) that rest on a notion of obligations concerning, rather than towards the dead. He then goes on to scrutinize Feinberg's «frontal» strategy, that consists in defending the possibility of (pre)posthumous harms, and, as a result, of obligations towards the dead. The A. (...) rejects this standpoint also, especially because of the deterministic view on which it rests, and because of the coexistence it implies between post-mortem properties and ante-mortem harm. Both lateral and frontal strategies thus fail to justify obligations towards the dead. The A. then suggests that if we wish to stick to the latter, we might have to endorse the metaphysical claim that seems to be implied in it (i.e. that dead people do exist in some morally relevant sense), unless we are ready to abandon the idea that a moral obligation towards a person only makes sense if this person is in a position to be harmed. (shrink)

In this article, we explore the implications of a Rawlsian theory for intergenerational issues. First, we confront Rawls's way of locating his `just savings' principle in his Theory of Justice with an alternative way of doing so. We argue that both sides of his intergenerational principle, as they apply to the accumulation phase and the steady-state stage, can be dealt with on the bases, respectively, of the principle of equal liberty (and its priority) and of the difference principle. We then (...) proceed by focusing on the implications of applying maximin to his steady-state stage. One central claim is that, in principle, Rawlsians should consider not only generational dissavings, but also generational savings, as unfair. This principle suffers a series of exceptions on which we focus in the fourth section of the article. In some cases, growth can be maximin compatible. Key Words: generations • egalitarianism • maximin • sustainability • growth • difference principle • John Rawls. (shrink)