Switch to: Citations

References in:

Computation and Functionalism: Syntactic Theory of Mind Revisited

In Gurol Irzik & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), Boston Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Springer (2005)

Add references

You must login to add references.

Must beliefs be sentences?Brian Loar - 1982 - Philosophy of Science Association 1982:627 - 643.details Two naturalistic explications of propositional attitudes and their contents are distinguished: the language of thought based theory, on which beliefs are relations to sentences in the language of thought; and the propositional attitude based theory, on which beliefs are functional states of a functional system that does not imply a language of thought, although consistent with it. The latter theory depends on interpersonally ascribable conceptual roles; if these are not available, the language of thought theory has the advantage. But the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
A Reply to Brian Loar's "Must Beliefs Be Sentences?".Jerry Fodor - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:644 - 653.details It is argued that Loar's paper overestimates the importance of the distinction between 'functionalist' and 'representationalist' theories of the propositional attitudes; specifically, that the only version of functionalism which appears likely to provide an adequate account of the attitudes is one which treats them as relations to mental representations. The paper ends with a brief discussion of some of Loar's objection to 'ideal indicator' theories of the relation between beliefs and their truth conditions. It is argued that these objections are (...) not decisive. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

1
2