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Animalism

Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883 (2015)

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  1. Animalism and the varieties of conjoined twinning.Tim Campbell & Jeff McMahan - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):285-301.
    We defend the view that we are not identical to organisms against the objection that it implies that there are two subjects of every conscious state one experiences: oneself and one’s organism. We then criticize animalism —the view that each of us is identical to a human organism—by showing that it has unacceptable implications for a range of actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning : dicephalus, craniopagus parasiticus, and cephalopagus.
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  • Review of Jonathan Dancy's (ed.) Reading Parfit. [REVIEW]Trenton Merricks - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (3):422-425.
    Like many others interested in Derek Parfit’s work, I’ve been awaiting this collection of original essays on Reasons and Persons, having placed an order with my bookstore at least a year before the book was finally published. The delay was due to the editor’s original plan of including Parfit’s responses, a plan that had to be abandoned. Eventually, Jonathan Dancy tells us, Parfit will publish responses to these pieces. And at least one response has already appeared in print, Parfit’s discussion (...)
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  • On What We Are.Sydney Shoemaker - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford handbook of the self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This article evaluates whether personal identity should be sought only in the biological or embodied existence of the person or exclusively in psychological existence. It suggests that whatever the answer turns out to be, it would involve causality. It argues against the animalist view of personal identity and defends the classical neo-Lockean view by arguing that the thick properties of person are psychological or mental ones. The author's answer to the question of what we are is in part that we (...)
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  • Sameness, substance and the human animal.David Wiggins - 2000 - The Philosophers' Magazine 12 (12):50-53.
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  • Persons and other things.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):5-6.
    In the large recent literature on the nature of human persons, persons are usually studied in isolation from the world in which they live. What persons are most fundamentally, philosophers say, are human animals, or brains, or perhaps souls -- without any consideration of the social and physical environments without which persons would not exist. In this article, I want to compensate for such overly narrow focus. Instead of beginning with the nature of persons cut off from any environment, I (...)
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  • Property Dualism and Substance Dualism.Penelope Mackie - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):181-199.
    I attempt to rebut Dean Zimmerman's novel argument (2010), which he presents in support of substance dualism, for the conclusion that, in spite of its popularity, the combination of property dualism with substance materialism represents a precarious position in the philosophy of mind. I take issue with Zimmerman's contention that the vagueness of ‘garden variety’ material objects such as brains or bodies makes them unsuitable candidates for the possession of phenomenal properties. I also argue that the ‘speculative materialism’ that is (...)
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  • Persons and Bodies: How to Avoid the New Dualism.Michael Burke - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):457 - 467.
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  • Many Minds, No Persons.W. R. Carter - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):55-70.
    Four non-Cartesian conceptions of a person are considered. I argue tor one of these, a position called animalism. I reject the idea that a (human) person coincides with, but is numerically distinct from, a certain human animal. Coinciding physical beings would both be psychological subjects. I argue that such subjects could not engage in self-reference. Since self-reference (or the capacity tor self-reference) is a necessary condition for being a person, no physical subject coincident with another such subject can be a (...)
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  • A Hylomorphic Account of Thought Experiments Concerning Personal Identity.David B. Hershenov - 2008 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82 (3):481-502.
    Hylomorphism offers a third way between animalist approaches to personal identity, which maintain that psychology is irrelevant to our persistence, andneo-Lockean accounts, which deny that humans are animals. This paper provides a Thomistic account that explains the intuitive responses to thought experiments involving brain transplants and the transformation of organic bodies into inorganic ones. This account does not have to follow the animalist in abandoning the claim that it is our identity which matters in survival, or countenance the puzzles of (...)
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  • The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival.Dean W. Zimmerman - 1999 - Faith and Philosophy 16 (2):194-212.
    It is not easy to be a materialist and yet believe that there is a way for human beings to survive death. Peter van Inwagen identifies the central obstacle the materialist faces: Namely, the need to posit appropriate “immanent-causal” connections between my body as it is at death and some living body elsewhere or elsewhen. I offer a proposal, consistent with van Inwagen’s own materialist metaphysics, for making materialism compatible with the possibility of survival.
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  • The Survival of the Sentient.Peter Unger - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:325-348.
    In this quite modestly ambitious essay, I'll generally just assume that, for the most part, our "scientifically informed" commonsense view of the world is true. Just as it is with such unthinking things as planets, plates and, I suppose, plants, too, so it also is with all earthly thinking beings, from people to pigs and pigeons; each occupies a region of space, however large or small, in which all are spatially related to each other. Or, at least, so it is (...)
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  • The Remnant-Person Problem.Eric T. Olson - forthcoming - In Stephan Blatti Paul F. Snowdon (ed.), Essays on Animalism. Oxford University Press.
    Animalism is the view that you and I are animals. That is, we are animals in the straightforward sense of having the property of being an animal, or in that each of us is identical to an animal-not merely in the derivative sense of having animal bodies, or of being "constituted by" animals. And by 'animal' I mean an organism of the animal kingdom." Sensible though it may appear, animalism is highly contentious. The most common objection is that it conflicts (...)
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  • Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul.Kevin Corcoran - 2006 - Grand Rapids: Mich.: Baker Academic.
    Presents a new way of looking at what it means to be human, offering a convincing case that humans are more than immaterial souls or "biological computers".
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  • Our Identity and the Separability of Persons and Organisms.Ingmar Persson - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (3):519-.
    RésuméLes philosophes appartenant à la tradition lockienne considèrent qu'en tant que personnes ou sujets de pensée et d'expérience, nous sommes distincts de nos organismes humains. Cela conduirait, selon des théoriciens qui veulent plutôt nous identifier à ces organismes, à un dédoublement paradoxal des sujets en question. Les objectifs principaux de cet article sont, premièrement, de soutenir à l'encontre de cet argument que la séparabilité des personnes par rapport à leurs organismes peut être comprise d'une manière non paradoxale; et deuxièmement, de (...)
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  • Problems with a Constitution Account of Persons.David B. Hershenov - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (2):291.
    ABSTRACT: There are some problems with Lynne Baker’s constitution account of personal identity that become evident when we consider brain transplant thought experiments and two kinds of rare cases of conjoined twins — the first appears to be one organism but two persons and the second seems to involve two organisms associated with one person. To handle the problems arising from brain transplants, the constitution theorist must admit an additional level of constitution between the organism and the person. To resolve (...)
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  • The Self: the Incredulous Stare Articulated.Peter van Inwagen - 2004 - Ratio 17 (4):478-491.
    This paper is an examination of Galen Strawson’s theory of the human person as a succession of momentary selves (or SESMETs: Subjects of Experience that are Single MEntal Things). Insofar as there is a clear distinction between enduring objects and events or processes, SESMETs would seem to partake of the features of both, for they are at once short‐lived subjects of consciousness and brief episodes of consciousness. Strawson in fact rejects the object/ process distinction, and contends that there is no (...)
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  • Realism about Personal Identity over Time.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):173 - 187.
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  • On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright.Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.) - 1987 - MIT Press.
    Richard Cartwright's impact on other philosophers has been as much a product of his own personal contact with students and colleagues as the result of his written work. The essays in this book demonstrate the deep influence he has had, not only by his thinking but equally by his style and manner and, above all, by his clarity and purity of intention. All of the essays are concerned with the questions of logic, language, and metaphysics that have been at the (...)
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  • Hylemorphic animalism.Patrick Toner - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):65 - 81.
    Roughly, animalism is the doctrine that each of us is identical with an organism. This paper explains and defends a hylemorphic version of animalism. I show how hylemorphic animalism handles standard objections to animalism in compelling ways. I also show what the costs of endorsing hylemorphic animalism are. The paper's contention is that despite the costs, the view is worth taking seriously.
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  • On Hylemorphism and Personal Identity.Patrick Toner - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):454-473.
    Abstract: There is no such thing as ‘the’ hylemorphic account of personal identity. There are several views that count as hylemorphic, and these views can be grouped into two main families—the corruptionist view, and the survivalist view. The differentiating factor is that the corruptionist view holds that the persistence of the soul is not sufficient for the persistence of the person, while the survivalist view holds that the persistence of the soul is sufficient for the persistence of the person. In (...)
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  • Materialism does not save the phenomena and the alternative which does.Uwe Meixner - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The waning of materialism. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter offers a version of Cartesian dualism that draws on the resources of a Husserlian account of intentionality. For example, it argues that 'I can locate myself at the point in space from which I am looking at the world (my 'center of perspective')'. It relies on empirical phenomenology to show that this location that does not correspond to my body or any part of it. Phantom sensations provide confirming evidence. Next, the chapter uses the example of blurred (versus (...)
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  • Persons and the unity of consciousness.William Hasker - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The waning of materialism. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Twinning, inorganic replacement, and the organism view.S. Matthew Liao - 2010 - Ratio 23 (1):59-72.
    In explicating his version of the Organism View, Eric Olson argues that you begin to exist only after twinning is no longer possible and that you cannot survive a process of inorganic replacement. Assuming the correctness of the Organism View, but pace Olson, I argue in this paper that the Organism View does not require that you believe either proposition. The claim I shall make about twinning helps to advance a debate that currently divides defenders of the Organism View, while (...)
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  • Substance concepts and personal identity.Peter Nichols - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):255-270.
    According to one argument for Animalism about personal identity, animal , but not person , is a Wigginsian substance concept—a concept that tells us what we are essentially. Person supposedly fails to be a substance concept because it is a functional concept that answers the question “what do we do?” without telling us what we are. Since person is not a substance concept, it cannot provide the criteria for our coming into or going out of existence; animal , on the (...)
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  • The Ethics of Killing. [REVIEW]Dennis Mckerlie - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):477-490.
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  • Shoemaker’s Problem of Too Many Thinkers.David B. Hershenov - 2006 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:225-236.
    Shoemaker maintains that when a functionalist theory of mind is combined with his belief about individuating properties and the well-known cerebrumtransplant thought experiment, the resulting position will be a version of the psychological approach to personal identity that can avoid The Problem of Too Many Thinkers. I maintain that the costs of his solution—that the human animal is incapable of thought—are too high. Shoemaker also has not provided an argumentagainst there existing a merely conscious being that is not essentially self-conscious (...)
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  • Self and substance.Sydney Shoemaker - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:283-304.
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  • The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of Resurrection.David B. Hershenov - 2003 - Faith and Philosophy 20 (1):24-36.
    If one does not possess an immaterial and immortal soul, then the prospect of conscious experience after death would appear to depend upon the metaphysical possibility of the resurrection of one’s biological life.[i] By “resurrection,” I don’t mean just the possibility that a dead but still existing and well preserved individual could be brought back to life. My contention is that the human organism can even cease to exist, perhaps as a result of cremation or extensive decay, and yet still (...)
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  • Précis of sameness and substance renewed. [REVIEW]David Wiggins - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):442–448.
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  • In defense of the words 'human body'.Michael Tye - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (2):177 - 182.
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  • Critical Notice. Eric Olson, the human animal (new York: Oxford university press, l997).Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Noûs 33 (3):496–504.
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  • Consciousness and persons: Unity and identity, Michael Tye. Cambridge, ma, and London, uk.Eric T. Olson - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):500–503.
    There is much to admire in this book. It is written in a pleasingly straightforward style, and offers insight on a wide range of important issues.
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  • The ethics of killing.Dennis Mckerlie - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):477–490.
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  • ‘Partist’ Resistance to the Many. [REVIEW]W. R. Carter - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):713–723.
    We are confronted by a metaphysical problem and discover, to our dismay, that standard proposals for its resolution have strongly counterintuitive corollaries. That naturally encourages consideration of previously overlooked or neglected ways out of the problem. As it turns out, one of these unorthodox proposals has a leg up on the various standard ways out of our problem. Metaphysical progress.
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  • Was I ever a fetus?Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):95-110.
    The Standard View of personal identity says that someone who exists now can exist at another time only if there is continuity of her mental contents or capacities. But no person is psychologically continuous with a fetus, for a fetus, at least early in its career, has no mental features at all. So the Standard View entails that no person was ever a fetus--contrary to the popular assumption that an unthinking fetus is a potential person. It is also mysterious what (...)
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  • Dion’s Foot.Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (5):260-265.
    Suppose a certain man, Dion, has his foot amputated, and lives to tell the tale. That tale involves a well-known metaphysical puzzle, for most of us assume that there was, before the operation, an object made up of all of Dion’s parts except those that overlapped with his foot-- ”all of Dion except for his foot”, we might say, or Dion’s “foot-complement”. Call that object Theon. (Anyone who doubts that there is such a thing as Dion’s undetached foot-complement may imagine (...)
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  • Death and bodily transfiguration.W. R. Carter - 1984 - Mind 93 (371):412-418.
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  • Why there are no people.Peter Unger - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):177-222.
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  • The essentials of persons.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (3-4):227-41.
    This paper tries to clarify the nature of philosophical questions as to the ontological nature of things, especially persons. It considers implications of an Aristotelian account, which leads to an ontology that makes subjects and other things epistemologically remote. This makes the account doubtfully reconcilable with the special epistemic relation that each of us has to oneself, via for example the cogito.
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  • How to live forever without saving your soul: Physicalism and immortality.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - In Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Soul, body, and survival: essays on the metaphysics of human persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 183-201.
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  • The Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psycho-physical Dualism.Uwe Meixner - 2004 - Mentis.
    This book is intended as a comprehensive defense of psycho-physical dualism. It gives answers to the question of what dualism may consist in, and inquires into the broadly cultural motivation behind accepting dualism or its opponent physicalism. Arguments for dualism, among them strengthened versions of the famous classical arguments, are presented and defended against objections. Moreover, the various general objections to dualism are criticized in detail, for example, the allegation that dualism is of an anti-scientific nature. The book issues into (...)
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  • The place of the self in contemporary metaphysics.Rory Madden - 2015 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Mind, Self and Person. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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