Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.

This book is a defence of a form of realism which stands closest to that upheld by the Nyãya-Vaid'sesika school in classical India. The author presents the Nyãya view and critically examines it against that of its traditional opponent, the Buddhist version of phenomenalism and idealism. His reconstruction of Nyãya arguments meets not only traditional Buddhist objections but also those of modern sense-data representationalists.

The purpose of the article is to examine the development of skepticism in indian philosophical thought. A number of important vedic passages are analyzed in order to show that although the authors were concerned with questions about the origins and guarantees of knowledge claims, There was no developed philosophical skepticism in the vedic age. The skepticism of purandara is examined to illustrate the carvaka position. Jayarasi bhatta's thorough-Going skepticism is examined to show that complete skepticism is self-Contradictory--It involves claiming to (...) know that the criteria for valid knowledge "cannot" be met. It is suggested that recognition of the skeptic's inconsistency in holding that it is "known" that no knowledge is possible may have been one of the reasons why skepticism failed to take hold in india, Despite great emphasis on epistemological issues. (shrink)

The paper presents an analysis of the anumāna chapter of Jayarāśi’s Tattvôpaplava-siṁha and the nature of his criticism levelled against the anumāna model. The results of the analysis force us to revise our understanding of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa as a sceptic. Instead, he emerges as a highly critical philosopher. In addition, the nature of Jayarāśi’s criticism of the anumāna model allow us to conclude that anumāna should not be equated with inference, but rather is its limited subset, and may at best (...) be rendered as ‘disputational inference’, ‘debational inference’ or even ‘dialogical inference’. Jayarāśi applies a range of logical laws which clearly represent patterns of what can be classified as a priori reasoning and analytical justifications for knowledge, which were traditionally not reckoned sound. Against the backdrop of Jayarāśi’s criticism of anumāna, the paper also attempts to provide an explanation to why Indian philosophy and logic did not develop any concept of proper symbols and variables. (shrink)

This book argues that the philosophical history of India contains a tradition of skepticism about philosophy represented most clearly by three figures: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa. Furthermore, understanding this tradition ought to be an important part of our contemporary metaphilosophical reflections on the purposes and limits of philosophy.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.