It is often argued that human emotions, and the cognitions that accompany them, involve refinements of, and extensions to, more basic functionality shared with other species. Such refinements may rely on common or on distinct processes and representations. Multi-level theories of cognition and affect make distinctions between qualitatively different types of representations often dealing with bodily, affective and cognitive attributes of self-related meanings. This paper will adopt a particular multi-level perspective on mental architecture and show how a mechanism of subsystem (...) differentiation could have allowed an evolutionarily “old” role for emotion in the control of action to have altered into one more closely coupled to meaning systems. We conclude by outlining some illustrative consequences of our analysis that might usefully be addressed in research in comparative psychology, cognitive archaeology, and in laboratory research on memory for emotional material. (shrink)

The human ability to live according to learned, shared rules of behavior requires cortical functions. Is the limbic system also necessary for culture or are its functions opposed to it, requiring cortical inhibition? The sizes of monkey and ape neocortical and major limbic structures scale with brain weight, but the neocortex expands more (has a steeper exponent) than limbic structures. As the human brain evolved it did not deviate from the scaling relationships found in nonhuman anthropoids. This evidence for conservation (...) in scaling supports the idea that limbic functions are necessary for human symbolism and culture. (shrink)