Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Waging War on Pascal's Wager.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):27-56.
    Pascal’s Wager is simply too good to be true—or better, too good to be sound. There must be something wrong with Pascal’s argument that decision-theoretic reasoning shows that one must (resolve to) believe in God, if one is rational. No surprise, then, that critics of the argument are easily found, or that they have attacked it on many fronts. For Pascal has given them no dearth of targets.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory.Peter Vallentyne & Shelly Kagan - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):5-26.
    000000001. Introduction Call a theory of the good—be it moral or prudential—aggregative just in case (1) it recognizes local (or location-relative) goodness, and (2) the goodness of states of affairs is based on some aggregation of local goodness. The locations for local goodness might be points or regions in time, space, or space-time; or they might be people, or states of nature.1 Any method of aggregation is allowed: totaling, averaging, measuring the equality of the distribution, measuring the minimum, etc.. Call (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • The Logic of Decision.Richard Jeffrey - 1965 - University of Chicago Press.
    "[This book] proposes new foundations for the Bayesian principle of rational action, and goes on to develop a new logic of desirability and probabtility."—Frederic Schick, _Journal of Philosophy_.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   335 citations  
  • Non-Archimedean Utility Theory.H. J. Skala - 1978 - Noûs 12 (1):69-72.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Pascal's Wager and Infinite Utilities.Antony Duff - 1986 - Analysis 46 (2):107 - 109.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • The Christian Wager: R. G. SWINBURNE.R. G. Swinburne - 1969 - Religious Studies 4 (2):217-228.
    On what grounds will the rational man become a Christian? It is often assumed by many, especially non-Christians, that he will become a Christian if and only if he judges that the evidence available to him shows that it is more likely than not that the Christian theological system is true, that, in mathematical terms, on the evidence available to him, the probability of its truth is greater than half. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate whether or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Pascalian Wagers.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1996 - Synthese 108 (1):11 - 61.
    A person who does not have good intellectual reasons for believing in God can, depending on his probabilities and values for consequences of believing, have good practical reasons. Pascalian wagers founded on a variety of possible probability/value profiles are examined from a Bayesian perspective central to which is the idea that states and options are pragmatically reasonable only if they maximize subjective expected value. Attention is paid to problems posed by representations of values by Cantorian infinities. An appendix attends to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Betting Against Pascal's Wager.Gregory Mougin & Elliott Sober - 1994 - Noûs 28 (3):382-395.
    Only one traditional objection to Pascal's wager is telling: Pascal assumes a particular theology, but without justification. We produce two new objections that go deeper. We show that even if Pascal's theology is assumed to be probable, Pascal's argument does not go through. In addition, we describe a wager that Pascal never considered, which leads away from Pascal's conclusion. We then consider the impact of these considerations on other prudential arguments concerning what one should believe, and on the more general (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Utilitarianism and Infinite Utility.Peter Vallentyne - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):212 – 217.
    Traditional act utilitarianism judges an action permissible just in case it produces as much aggregate utility as any alternative. It is often supposed that utilitarianism faces a serious problem if the future is infinitely long. For in that case, actions may produce an infinite amount of utility. And if that is so for most actions, then utilitarianism, it appears, loses most of its power to discriminate among actions. For, if most actions produce an infinite amount of utility, then few actions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Pascal's Wager Revisited.Jeff Jordan - 1998 - Religious Studies 34 (4):419-431.
    Pascal's wager attempts to provide a prudential reason in support of the rationality of believing that God exists. The wager employs the idea that the utility of theistic belief, if true, is infinite, and in this way, the expected utility of theism swamps that of any of its rivals. Not surprisingly the wager generates more than a good share of philosophical criticism. In this essay I examine two recent objections levelled against the wager and I argue that each fails. Following (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Christian Wager.R. G. Swinburne - 1969 - Religious Studies 4 (2):217-228.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Objecting Vaguely to Pascal's Wager.Alan Hájek - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (1-16):1 - 16.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • A Central Theistic Argument.George N. Schlesinger - 1994 - In Jeff Jordan (ed.), Gambling on God: Essays on Pascal’s Wager. Rowman & Littlefield.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Logic of Pascal's Wager.Ian Hacking - 1972 - American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (2):186 - 192.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory.Michael Resnik - 1987 - Univ of Minnesota Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations