First published in 1962, contains the William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955. It sets out Austin's conclusions in the field to which he directed his main efforts for at least the last ten years of his life. Starting from an exhaustive examination of his already well- known distinction of performative utterances from statements, Austin here finally abandons that distinction, replacing it by a more general theory of 'illocutionary forces' of utterances which has important bearings on a wide (...) variety of philosophical problems. (shrink)

"Catharine A. MacKinnon, noted feminist and legal scholar, explores and develops her original theories and practical proposals on sexual politics and law. These discourses, originally delivered as speeches, have been brilliantly woven into a book that retains all the spontaneity and accessibility of a live presentation. Through these engaged works on issues such as rape, abortion, athletics, sexual harassment, and pornography, MacKinnon seeks feminism on its own terms, unconstrained by the limits of prior traditions. She argues that viewing gender as (...) a matter of sameness and difference--as virtually all existing theory and law have done--covers up the reality of gender, which is a system of social hierarchy, an imposed inequality of power"--Back cover. (shrink)

This chapter considers whether ordinary instances of racist hate speech can be authoritative, thereby constituting the subordination of people of color. It is often said that ordinary speakers cannot subordinate because they lack authority. Here it is argued that there are more ways in which speakers can come to have authority than have been generally recognized. In part, this is because authority has been taken to be too closely tied to social position. This chapter presents a series of examples which (...) show that speaker authority needn’t derive from social position at all. Moreover, these examples also show that a speaker can come to have authority even when they lack it prior to speaking. After distinguishing these different ways in which speakers can come to have authority, it is argued that there is ample reason to think that even producers of ordinary instances of racist hate speech can sometimes have authority in these ways. (shrink)

This paper argues that racist speech in public places ought to be regulable even with teh strict free speech protections of the First Amendment. McGowan argues that the same justification for regulating the hanging of a 'Whites Only' sign applies to racist utterances in public spaces.

This paper examines two recent contributions to the hate speech literature – by Steven Heyman and Jeremy Waldron – which seek a justification for the legal restriction of hate speech in an account of the way that hate speech infringes against people’s dignity. These analyses look beyond the first-order hurts and disadvantages suffered by the immediate targets of hate speech, and consider the prospect of hate speech sustaining complex social structures whose wide-scale operations lower the social status of members of (...) targeted groups. In Heyman’s and Waldron’s accounts we find plausible insights into the nature of identity-based social hierarchies, and the harms that redound to subordinated people under the operations of such hierarchies. I argue, however, that both analyses are unsuccessful as justifications for the restriction of hate speech, because they do not ultimately provide reason to think that hate speech is responsible for creating or sustaining identity-based social hierarchies. (shrink)

This article examines the issues raised by recent legislation proscribing incitement to religious hatred. In particular, it examines how far arguments for prohibiting racist hate speech apply also to the prohibition of religious hate speech. It identifies a number of significant differences between race and religion. It also examines several questions raised by the prohibition of religious hate speech, including the meaning and scope of religious identity, why that identity should receive special protection, and whether protection should be directed to (...) religious groups as groups or to their individual members. The central argument of the article is that the distinction between protecting religious groups from vilification and protecting their beliefs and practices from criticism—a distinction on which the British Government placed great emphasis in defending its legislation—is unsustainable. That conclusion is supported by the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights in cases in which it has upheld the curtailing of freedom of expression for the sake of protecting religion. (shrink)

We all know that speech can be harmful. But how? Mary Kate McGowan argues that speech constitutes harm when it enacts a norm that prescribes that harm. She investigates such harms as oppression, subordination, and discrimination in such forms of speech as sexist remarks, racist hate speech, pornography, verbal triggers, and micro-aggressions.

In recent decades, American courts have held that public hate speech, such as the Nazi march in Skokie, must be protected under the First Amendment because there is no principled way to distinguish that speech from other forms of political expression. Many American constitutional scholars take the same view. In this essay, which is a contribution to an international symposium on Extreme Speech and Democracy, I offer an alternative understanding of hate speech, public discourse, and freedom of expression. In Part (...) I, I outline a general theory of the First Amendment. On this view, free speech is rooted in respect for the autonomy and dignity of human beings. But the same values that justify freedom of speech also give rise to other fundamental rights which are entitled to protection under the law. Speech that infringes these rights may be regulated by narrowly drawn laws, except in situations where the value of the speech is sufficient to justify the injuries it causes. Part II applies this approach to political hate speech like the Nazi march. I begin by arguing that this form of speech invades its targets' rights to personal security, personality, citizenship, and equality. The crucial question then becomes whether this form of speech nevertheless should be protected because of its political character. The answer to this question turns on our conception of political speech. After criticizing two of the leading theories in this area - Justice Holmes's vision of the marketplace of ideas and Robert C. Post's theory of public discourse - I argue that political speech is best understood as discourse among individuals who recognize one another as free and equal persons and members of the political community - a view that derives support from classic theorists such as Locke and Hegel as well as from contemporary theorists such as Meiklejohn and Habermas. By denying recognition to its targets, political hate speech violates the fundamental ground rules that should govern political debate. For these reasons, I contend that, in principle, this form of speech should not receive constitutional protection. Interpreting the First Amendment in this way would not only allow American law to reconcile the competing demands of free speech and human dignity, it would also bring that law into harmony with the approach to political hate speech that is taken by many other liberal democratic nations and the international community. (shrink)