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  1. Realism about what?Roger Jones - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (2):185-202.
    Preanalytically, we are all scientific realists. But both philosophers and scientists become uncomfortable when forced into analysis. In the case of scientists, this discomfort often arises from practical difficulties in setting out a carefully described set of objects which adequately account for the phenomena with which they are concerned. This paper offers a set of representative examples of these difficulties for contemporary physicists. These examples challenge the traditional realist vision of mature scientific activity as struggling toward an ontologically well-defined world (...)
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  • There is good physics in theory reduction.Fritz Rohrlich - 1990 - Foundations of Physics 20 (11):1399-1412.
    Theory reduction is analyzed and examples are presented from various branches of physics. The procedure takes different forms in different theories. Examples from various theories are arranged in increasing order of difficulty. Special emphasis is placed on the quantum to classical reduction. It is argued that there is good and interesting physics in theory reduction and that it deserves more attention than it has been receiving in the past.
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  • Heuristics and the generalized correspondence principle.Hans Radder - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):195-226.
    Several philosophers of science have claimed that the correspondence principle can be generalized from quantum physics to all of (particularly physical) science and that in fact it constitutes one of the major heuristical rules for the construction of new theories. In order to evaluate these claims, first the use of the correspondence principle in (the genesis of) quantum mechanics will be examined in detail. It is concluded from this and from other examples in the history of science that the principle (...)
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  • Defining chaos.Robert W. Batterman - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (1):43-66.
    This paper considers definitions of classical dynamical chaos that focus primarily on notions of predictability and computability, sometimes called algorithmic complexity definitions of chaos. I argue that accounts of this type are seriously flawed. They focus on a likely consequence of chaos, namely, randomness in behavior which gets characterized in terms of the unpredictability or uncomputability of final given initial states. In doing so, however, they can overlook the definitive feature of dynamical chaos--the fact that the underlying motion generating the (...)
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  • Pluralistic ontology and theory reduction in the physical sciences.Fritz Rohrlich - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (3):295-312.
    It is demonstrated that the reduction of a physical theory S to another one, T, in the sense that S can be derived from T holds in general only for the mathematical framework. The interpretation of S and the associated central terms cannot all be derived from those of T because of the qualitative differences between the cognitive levels of S and T. Their cognitively autonomous status leads to an epistemic as well as an ontological pluralism. This pluralism is consistent (...)
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  • Established theories.Fritz Rohrlich & Larry Hardin - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):603-617.
    Criteria are given to characterize mature theories in contradistinction to developing theories. We lean heavily on the physical sciences. An established theory is defined as a mature one with known validity limits. The approximate truth of such theories is thereby given a quantitative character. Superseding theories do not falsify established theories because the latter are protected by their validity limits. This view of scientific realism leads to ontological levels and cumulativity of knowledge. It is applied to a defense of realism (...)
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  • Quantum Chaos and Semiclassical Mechanics.Robert Batterman - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:50-65.
    This paper discusses the problem of finding and defining chaos in quantum mechanics. While chaotic time evolution appears to be ubiquitous in classical mechanics, it is apparently absent in quantum mechanics in part because for a bound, isolated quantum system, the evolution of its state is multiply periodic. This has led a number of investigators to search for semiclassical signatures of chaos. Here I am concerned with the status of semiclassical mechanics as a distinct third theory of the asymptotic domain (...)
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  • Types of inter-theoretic reduction.Lawrence Sklar - 1967 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (2):109-124.
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  • Two concepts of intertheoretic reduction.Thomas Nickles - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (April):181-201.
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  • Chaos, quantization, and the correspondence principle.Robert W. Batterman - 1991 - Synthese 89 (2):189 - 227.
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  • The logic of reduction: The case of gravitation. [REVIEW]Fritz Rohrlich - 1989 - Foundations of Physics 19 (10):1151-1170.
    The reduction from Einstein's to Newton's gravitation theories (and intermediate steps) is used to exemplify reduction in physical theories. Both dimensionless and dimensional reduction are presented, and the advantages and disadvantages of each are pointed out. It is concluded that neither a completely reductionist nor a completely antireductionist view can be maintained. Only the mathematical structure is strictly reducible. The interpretation (the model, the central concepts) of the superseded theory T′ can at best only partially be derived directly from the (...)
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