In this illuminating study of Kant's theory of imagination and its role in interpretation, Rudolf A. Makkreel argues against the commonly held notion that Kant's transcendental philosophy is incompatible with hermeneutics. The charge that Kant's foundational philosophy is inadequate to the task of interpretation can be rebutted, explains Makkreel, if we fully understand the role of imagination in his work. In identifying this role, Makkreel also reevaluates the relationship among Kant's discussions of the feeling of life, common sense, and the (...) purposiveness of history. (shrink)

Much as we would like to conceive empirical thought as rationally grounded in experience, pitfalls await anyone who tries to articulate this position, and ...

Arthur Collins's succinct, revisionist exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason brings a new clarity to this notoriously difficult text.

This paper defends the thesis of the analyticity of the principle of apperception, as developed in the first part of the B-Deduction, against recent criticisms by Paul Guyer and Patricia Kitchen The first part presents these criticisms, the most important of which being that the analyticity thesis is incompatible with both the avowed goal of which being that the Deduction of establishing the validity of the categories and Üie account of apperception in the A-Deduction. The second part argues that Kant's (...) procedure in the B-Deduction of beginning with an abstract analysis of a discursive understanding, independentiy of its relation to the specifically human forms of sensibility, requires him to regard the principle as analytic and that this explains the difference from the A-Deduction. By appealing to the model of a deduction in Kant's moral theory and the two step in one proof structure of the B-Deduction, the third part argues that the analyticity thesis is in fact compatible with the goal of the Deduction. (shrink)

With this volume, Werner Pluhar completes his work on Kant's three Critiques, an accomplishment unique among English language translators of Kant. At once accurate, fluent, and accessible, Pluhar's rendition of the Critique of Practical Reason meets the standards set in his widely respected translations of the Critique of Judgement (1987) and the Critique of Pure Reason (1996).

t. 1. La déduction transcendentale avant la Critique de la raison pure.--t. 2. La déduction transcendentale de 1781 jusqu'à la deuxième édition de la Critique de la raison pure (1887).--t. 3. La déduction transcendentale de 1787 jusqu'à l'Opus postumum.

Originally published: London: Allen & Unwin, 1936.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The significance of Kant's philosophy is to be found primarily in his theory of knowledge, a theory that is set forth in his voluminous work, The Critique ...

Kant’s response to Cartesian scepticism is often characterized in the following way. Whereas Descartes drives a wedge between subjective experience and objective reality, Kant argues that there could be no such thing as experience at all if reality were not itself structured in just the way our thought about it is structured. This picture of Kant’s response to Descartes portrays him as succeeding, where Descartes fails, in arguing directly from the nature of experience to the nature of reality; as subscribing, (...) therefore, to Descartes’ view that one is immediately aware only of one’s own mental states, but as seeing a way out of the subjective predicament. I maintain that this picture is deeply flawed. Kant’s transcendental argument is in fact a thoroughgoing critique of Descartes’ subjectivism, and destroys the Cartesian barrier to recognizing that our awareness of reality is unmediated and direct. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

"Kant and the Capacity to Judge" will prove to be an important and influential event in Kant studies and in philosophy.

Consciousness, self-consciousness, mental unity, and the necessary conditions for cognition are issues of paramount importance for two prima facie distinct intellectual endeavors: contemporary cognitive science and interpretations of Kant. The goal of Andrew Brook’s timely and useful book is to contribute to both of these projects by showing how a better understanding of Kant’s views can also illuminate current controversies about how to model the mind.

Despite Kemp Smith's claims to the contrary, I show that there is good reason to believe that Kant was aware of Hume's attack on personal identity. My interpretive claim is that we can make sense of many of Kant's puzzling remarks in the subjective deduction by assuming that he was trying to reply to Hume's challenge. My substantive claim is that Kant succeeds in defending a notion of the self as a continuing sequence of informationally interdependent states.

In this innovative study Patricia Kitcher argues that we can only understand the deduction of the categories in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in terms of his attempt to fathom the psychological prerequisites of thought. Thus a consideration of his conception of psychology is essential to an understanding of his philosophy. Kitcher specifically considers Kant's claims about the unity of the thinking self; the spatial forms of human perceptions; the relations among mental states necessary for them to have content; the (...) relations between perceptions and judgment; and the limits of philosophical insight into psychological processes. (shrink)

Kant's views on logic and logical theory play an important role in his critical writings, especially the Critique of Pure Reason. However, since he published only one short essay on the subject, we must turn to the texts derived from his logic lectures to understand his views. The present volume includes three previously untranslated transcripts of Kant's logic lectures: the Blumberg Logic from the 1770s; the Vienna Logic (supplemented by the recently discovered Hechsel Logic) from the early 1780s; and the (...) Dohna-Wundlacken Logic from the early 1790s. Also included is a new translation of the Jasche Logic, compiled at Kant's request and published in 1800 but which also appears to stem in part from a transcript of his lectures. Together these texts provide a rich source of evidence for Kant's evolving views on logic, on the relations between logic and other disciplines, and on a variety of topics (e.g. analysis and synthesis) central to Kant's mature philosophy. They also provide a portrait of Kant as lecturer, a role in which he was both popular and influential. This volume contains substantial editorial apparatus: a general introduction, linguistic and factual notes, glossaries of key terms (both German/English and English/German) and concordances relating Kant's lectures to Georg Frederich Meier's Excerpts from the Doctrine of Reason, the book on which Kant lectured throughout his life and in which he left extensive notes. (shrink)

This book departs from much of the scholarship on Kant by demonstrating the centrality of imagination to Kant's philosophy as a whole. In Kant's works, human experience is simultaneously passive and active, thought and sensed, free and unfree: these dualisms are often thought of as unfortunate byproducts of his system. Gibbons, however, shows that imagination performs a vital function in "bridging gaps" between the different elements of cognition and experience. Thus, the role imagination plays in Kant's works expresses his fundamental (...) insight into the complexity of cognition for finite rational beings such as ourselves. (shrink)

This paper defends the thesis of the analyticity of the principle of apperception, as developed in the first part of the B-Deduction, against recent criticisms by Paul Guyer and Patricia Kitchen The first part presents these criticisms, the most important of which being that the analyticity thesis is incompatible with both the avowed goal of which being that the Deduction of establishing the vahdity of the categories and Üie account of apperception in the A-Deduction. The second part argues that Kant's (...) procedure in the B-Deduction of beginning with an abstract analysis of a discursive understanding, independentiy of its relation to the specifically human forms of sensibility, requires him to regard the principle as analytic and that this explains the difference from the A-Deduction. By appealing to the model of a deduction in Kant's moral theory and the two step in one proof structure of the B-Deduction, the third part argues that the analyticity thesis is in fact compatible with the goal of the Deduction. (shrink)

Kant's masterpiece, Critique of Pure Reason, is universally recognized to be among the most difficult of all philosophical writing, and yet it is required reading in almost every course that covers modern philosophy. Most students find Critique of Pure Reason impenetrable without the help of secondary sources. While there are numerous advanced scholarly works on the topic, Dicker's is the first treatment explicitly designed for undergraduates to read alongside the primary text, rendering Kant's views accessible without oversimplifying them. His book (...) will be useful to both undergraduate and graduate students tackling this notoriously difficult yet highly influential thinker in courses in modern philosophy, epistemology, and Kant. (shrink)

The central project of the Critique of Pure Reason is to answer two sets of questions: What can we know and how can we know it? and What can't we know and why can't we know it? The essays in this collection are intended to help students read the Critique of Pure Reason with a greater understanding of its central themes and arguments, and with some awareness of important lines of criticism of those themes and arguments.

Since the 1970s Barry Stroud has been one of the most original contributors to the philosophical study of human knowledge. This volume presents the best of Stroud's essays in this area. Throughout, he seeks to clearly identify the question that philosophical theories of knowledge are meant to answer, and the role scepticism plays in making sense of that question. In these seminal essays, he suggests that people pursuing epistemology need to concern themselves with whether philosophical scepticism is true or false. (...) Stroud's discussion of these fundamental questions is essential reading for anyone whose work touches on the subject of human knowledge. (shrink)

Kant's _Critique of Pure Reason_ is arguably the single most important work in western philosophy. The book introduces and assesses: * Kant's life and background of the _Critique of Pure Reason_ * the ideas and text of the _Critique of Pure Reason_ * the continuing relevance of Kant's work to contemporary philosophy. Ideal for anyone coming to Kant's thought for the first time. This guide will be vital reading for all students of Kant in philosophy.

James Van Cleve examines the main topics from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, such as transcendental idealism, necessity and analyticity, space and time, substance and cause, noumena and things-in-themselves, problems of the self, and rational theology. He also discusses the relationship between Kant's thought and that of modern anti-realists, such as Putnam and Dummett. Because Van Cleve focuses upon specific problems rather than upon entire passages or sections of the Critique, he makes Kant's work more accessible to the serious student (...) and scholar. (shrink)

Henry Allison is one of the foremost interpreters of the philosophy of Kant. This new volume collects all his recent essays on Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy. All the essays postdate Allison's two major books on Kant, and together they constitute an attempt to respond to critics and to clarify, develop and apply some of the central theses of those books. Two are published here for the first time. Special features of the collection are: a detailed defence of the author's (...) interpretation of transcendental idealism; a consideration of the Transcendental Deduction and some other recent interpretations thereof; further elaborations of the tensions between various aspects of Kant's conception of freedom and of the complex role of this conception within Kant's moral philosophy. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues, partly in response to Hume, that the mind brings an elaborate a priori structure to its interactions with the world. In his transcendental psychology, Kant argues for a number of theses about the nature of the mind of a subject that has cognition of empirical objects. This dissertation presents Kant's transcendental psychology and argues against a number of Patricia Kitcher's and Peter Strawson's criticisms. ;As a prelude to Kant's philosophical psychology, I reconstruct (...) Hume's position in my second chapter and argue that his psychological theory of belief formation is inconsistent with the conclusions of his analysis of causal connection. ;My third chapter examines Strawson's "austere" reconstruction of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, from which Strawson attempts to exclude transcendental psychology and Kant's Subjective Deduction. Strawson argues that Kant is inconsistent because his transcendental psychology violates a principle of empirical significance that Strawson attributes to Kant. I argue that Strawson's "austere" version of Kant's argument is incomplete and inconsistent; Kant does not hold Strawson's principle of empirical significance. ;I then turn to a detailed reconstruction of Kant's Subjective Deduction. I argue that it is a regressive argument and that it argues for theses about the faculties necessary for empirical cognition. More specifically, Kant's transcendental unity of apperception has been misunderstood and misrepresented by Strawson, Kitcher, and Wolff. I draw an important distinction between the synthetic unity of representations in empirical judgments and the transcendental unity of the subject that is the ground of synthetic activity. ;My fifth chapter is devoted to Kitcher's interpretation of Kant's transcendental psychology. She argues that the claims of transcendental psychology should be interpreted functionalistically and causally. I argue that Kant's account of the transcendental functions of the mind should not be read causally. I also object to Kitcher's interpretation of apperceptive unity. I argue that she, like many commentators, has not acknowledged the two kinds of apperceptive unity in the Transcendental Deduction. This discussion concludes my defense of Kant's transcendental psychology. (shrink)