The final chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is generally considered by interpreters to inaugurate an absolute knowing that eliminates any significant opposition between subject and object. Such an understanding of Hegel, however, fails to do justice to the numerous passages in the Phenomenology in which Hegel criticizes just such a reduction of the opposed moments of spirit. In this essay, I argue for an alternative to this traditional interpretation of absolute knowing.

Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit presents the course through which consciousness must pass as it progresses toward true self-knowing. This process consists in consciousness’ self-examination in which its self-knowing is repeatedly compared with the object or standard of this knowing - namely, the nature or concept of spirit. Hegel presents this process, which is the very method of the Phenomenology, in the second part of the Introduction. In this paper, I will argue that only a reinterpretation of absolute knowing provides the (...) key to unlocking the secret of this method. (shrink)