This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do the explanatory jobs that realists expect of them. Equally, several widely-held realist theses about the nature of inter-theoretic relations and scientific progress are scrutinized and found wanting. Finally, it is argued that the history of science, far from confirming scientific realism, decisively confutes several extant versions of avowedly 'naturalistic' forms of scientific (...) realism. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the generation and function of hitherto ignored or misrepresented interfield theories , theories which bridge two fields of science. Interfield theories are likely to be generated when two fields share an interest in explaining different aspects of the same phenomenon and when background knowledge already exists relating the two fields. The interfield theory functions to provide a solution to a characteristic type of theoretical problem: how are the relations between fields to be explained? In solving this problem (...) the interfield theory may provide answers to questions which arise in one field but cannot be answered within it alone, may focus attention on domain items not previously considered important, and may predict new domain items for one or both fields. Implications of this analysis for the problems of reduction and the unity and progress of science are mentioned. (shrink)

Four current accounts of theory reduction are presented, first informally and then formally: (1) an account of direct theory reduction that is based on the contributions of Nagel, Woodger, and Quine, (2) an indirect reduction paradigm due to Kemeny and Oppenheim, (3) an "isomorphic model" schema traceable to Suppes, and (4) a theory of reduction that is based on the work of Popper, Feyerabend, and Kuhn. Reference is made, in an attempt to choose between these schemas, to the explanation of (...) physical optics by Maxwell's electromagnetic theory, and to the revisions of genetics necessitated by partial biochemical reductions of genetics. A more general reduction schema is proposed which: (1) yields as special cases the four reduction paradigms considered above, (2) seems to be in better accord with both the canons of logic and actual scientific practice, and (3) clarifies the problems of meaning variance and ontological reduction. (shrink)

The climate of epistemological opinion is rapidly changing in the direction of an increasing concern with the substantive results of the empirical sciences of man, such as psychology and biology. This change is of a comparatively recent date: as late as in 1964, Chauncey Wright’s seminal speculations on the biology of knowledge-processes were shrugged off by one commentator as “nineteenth-century impedimenta and paraphernalia”. Today, such a judgment seems strangely out of date. Our knowledge of man as an animal has been (...) broadened and deepened, both by the dramatic advances of molecular biology and by the recent appearance of the ‘sociobiology’ represented by Edward O. Wilson. To the philosopher, the question inevitably arises of how far this knowledge extends and, in particular, to what extent it can account for peculiarly human intellectual phenomena, such as the growth of scientific knowledge. The study of man as an animal and the study of man as a knower can no longer be simply assumed to be two distinct and separate departments of thought. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of Darwinian models of the growth of scientific knowledge. Donald Campbell, Karl Popper, Stephen Toulmin, and others have discussed analogies between the development of biological species and the development of scientific knowledge: in both kinds of development, we find variation, selection, and transmission. It is argued that these similarities are superficial, and that closer examination of biological evolution and of the history of science shows that a non-Darwinian approach to historical epistemology is needed. An adequate (...) model of the growth of knowledge will have to go beyond evolutionary epistemology in discussing the role of intentional, abductive theory construction in scientific discovery, the selection of theories according to general criteria, the achievement of progress by sustained application of criteria, and the transmission of selected theories in highly organized scientific communities. (shrink)

The reductionistic vision of evolutionary theory, "the gene's eye view of evolution" is the dominant view among evolutionary biologists today. On this view, the gene is the only unit with sufficient stability to act as a unit of selection, with individuals and groups being more ephemeral units of function, but not of selection. This view is argued to be incorrect, on several grounds. The empirical and theoretical bases for the existence of higher-level units of selection are explored, and alternative analyses (...) discussed critically. The success of a multi-level selection theory demands the recognition and development of a multi-level genetics. The way to accomplish this is suggested. The genotype/phenotype distinction also requires further analysis to see how it applies at higher levels of organization. This analysis provides a way of defining genotype and phenotype for cultural evolution, and a treatment of the innate-acquired distinction which are both generalizeable to analyze problems of the nature and focus of scientific change. (shrink)

SynopsisThe response to physics and chemistry which characterized mid-nineteenth century physiology took two major directions. One, found most prominently among the German physiologists, developed explanatory models which had as their fundamental assumption the ultimate reducibility of all biological phenomena to the laws of physics and chemistry. The other, characteristic of the French school of physiology, recognized that physics and chemistry provided potent analytical tools for the exploration of physiological activities, but assumed in the construction of explanatory models that the organism (...) involved special levels of organization and that there must, in consequence, be special biological laws.The roots of this argument about concept formation in physiology are explored in the works of Theodor Schwann, Johannes Müller, François Magendie and Claude Bernard among others. (shrink)

The climate of epistemological opinion is rapidly changing in the direction of an increasing concern with the substantive results of the empirical sciences of man, such as psychology and biology. This change is of a comparatively recent date: as late as in 1964, Chauncey Wright’s seminal speculations on the biology of knowledge-processes were shrugged off by one commentator as “nineteenth-century impedimenta and paraphernalia”. Today, such a judgment seems strangely out of date. Our knowledge of man as an animal has been (...) broadened and deepened, both by the dramatic advances of molecular biology and by the recent appearance of the ‘sociobiology’ represented by Edward O. Wilson. To the philosopher, the question inevitably arises of how far this knowledge extends and, in particular, to what extent it can account for peculiarly human intellectual phenomena, such as the growth of scientific knowledge. The study of man as an animal and the study of man as a knower can no longer be simply assumed to be two distinct and separate departments of thought. (shrink)