In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The humble origins of Russell's paradox by J. Alberto Coffa ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS Russell pointed out that the discovery of his celebrated paradox concerning the class of all classes not belonging to themselves was intimately related to Cantor's proof that there is no greatest cardinal. lOne of the earliest remarks to that effect occurs in The Principles ofMathematics where, referring to the universal class, the class of all classes (...) and the class of all propositions, he notes that when we apply the reasoning of his [Cantor's] proofto the cases in question we find ourselves met by definite contradictions, of which the one discussed in Chapter x is an example. (P. 362) And in a footnote he adds: "It was in this way that I discovered this contradiction". Throughout his writings Russell left a number ofhints concerning the sort of connection he had drawn between Cantor's proof and his own discovery. In fact, his suggestions are so specific that there would seem to be little room left for speculation concerning how the discovery took place.2 The picture that emerges almost immediately from Russell's observations is the following. For reasons which are 1 See, e.g., Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd ed. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1937), §§100, 344-9; G. Frege, Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1976), pp. 215-16; B. Russell, Essays in Analysis, ed. D. Lackey (New York: George Braziller, 1973), p. 139; B. Russell, Introducrion to Mathemarical Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), p. 136; B. Russell, My Philosophical Development (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), pp. 75-6; The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, I (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), 195. 2 See, e.g., Ch. Thiel's "Einleitung des Herausgebers" in Frege, Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel, pp. 203 and 216 (footnote), and 1. Grattan-Guinness, "How Bertrand Russell Discovered his Paradox", Historia Marhematica, 5 (1978),127-37. 31 32 Russell, nos. 33-4 (Spring-Summer 1979) never made clear, Russell decided to analyze Cantor's argument applying it to "large" classes such as the universal class V, and the class of all classes. When, for example, we consider V, its power set and the correlationf(x) = {x} if x is not a class, f(x) =. x otherwise, then Cantor's diagonal class D turns out to be the class of all classes not belonging to themselves. Moreover, since the element ofV which is taken toD byfisD itself(i.e., sincef(D) = D), Cantor's reasoning invites us to raise the question whether D belongs tof(D) (i.e., toD) or not; and it establishes that it does precisely if it doesn't.3 The purpose of this note is to present recently uncovered information that complements and corrects our present understanding of Russell's discovery of his paradox. As it turns out, far from originating from his desire to apply the ideas in Cantor's theorem, a version of Russell's paradox first occurred in an argument that Russell had devised, late in 1900, in order to establish the invalidity of that theorem. An appeal to "large" classes such as V or Class was, as we shall see, essential to Russell's attempted refutation. As he displayed the details of his counterexample Russell's paradox emerged, at first unrecognized, as the by-product of a project that the paradox itself would eventually undermine. In a paper written in 1901 and largely devoted to a popular exposition and defence of Cantor's theory of the infinite, Russell expressed what appeared to be a rpinor reservation to Cantor's treatment : There is a greatest of all infinite numbers, which is the number of things altogether, of every sort and kind. It is obvious that there cannot be a greater number than this, because, if everything has been taken, there is nothing left to add. Cantor has a proof that there is no greatest number, and if this proof were valid, the contradictions of infinity would reappear in a sublimated form. But in this one point, the master has been guilty of a very subtle fallacy, which I hope to explain in some future work.4 3 See Principles, §349. Perhaps I should remind... (shrink)