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  1. Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
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  • Against Narrativity.Galen Strawson - 2004 - Ratio 17 (4):428-452.
    I argue against two popular claims. The first is a descriptive, empirical thesis about the nature of ordinary human experience: ‘each of us constructs and lives a “narrative” . . . this narrative is us, our identities’ (Oliver Sacks); ‘self is a perpetually rewritten story . . . in the end, we become the autobiographical narratives by which we “tell about” our lives’ (Jerry Bruner); ‘we are all virtuoso novelists. . . . We try to make all of our material (...)
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  • Theoretical Persons and Practical Agents.David W. Shoemaker - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (4):318-332.
    This paper defends Parfit's "theoretical" view of personal identity against Christine Korsgaard's objections grounded in practical identity.
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  • Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1989 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (2):103-31.
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  • Human concerns without superlative selves.Mark Johnston - 1997 - In J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit. Blackwell. pp. 149--79.
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