This paper explores the nature of time and its relation to our concerns for the future. It is shown how a new sense of time, chronological time, emerged with the rise of science and modernity. This now familiar time is rarely questioned. Yet, it is argued, this time is intimately bound up with our contemporary problems and our failure to effect solutions. In analysing chronological time it is revealed that the future is devoid of reality in it. This absence of (...) a real sense of the future explains our careless despoiling of the environment. To save our environment we need to resurrect a real sense for the future: only then can the future be truly valued. This means rediscovering another sense of time. This other time is named kairological time. In kairological time there is a more vivid awareness of the future. In this time, too, new ways of acting for the future are opened up. Possibilities for a wiser way to the future in part stem from a revaluation of the past. So the sense of being out of time to save ourselves and our planet can be overcome by a living in this other time, kairological time. (shrink)

Today, sustainable development is generally accepted as a guiding principle. The present relation societies have with the natural environment is considered as being not-sustainable. However this presupposes some idea about the quality of the environment and of activities affecting the environment and, as a consequence, of the quality of life. In this article I defend the proposition that the limited progress made with respect to the environment – despite all the good intentions – could be due to a potential conflict (...) between ' quality ' and sustainable development. In other words: our interpretation of the concept of ' quality ' is not compatible with the aims of sustainability. Some consequences for research and policy of accepting this proposition are discussed. (shrink)

This article concentrates on the Jacobs and Daly criticisms (Environmental Values, Spring 1994) of my earlier article in the same journal (Autumn 1994) criticising the concept of 'sustainable development'. Daly and Jacobs agreed with my criticisms of 'weak' sustainability, but defended 'strong' sustainability on the grounds that natural and manmade capital were 'complements' in the productive process and that economists are wrong, therefore, in assuming that they are infinitely substitutable. This article maintains that they are confusing different concepts of 'complementarity' (...) and 'substitutability'. It is also argued that, in fact, they do both sell crucial passes in their defence of strong sustainability without providing any clear criteria for their abandonment of it in certain cases. It is also denied that the fact that environmental services may provide different satisfactions from those obtained from other goods and services elevates it to the status of some over-riding moral value, or that discounting future costs and benefits is 'unfair' to future generations. (shrink)