- (1 other version)Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):109-111.details
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(2 other versions)Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.details
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Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by John Hawthorne.details
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Mood and Modality.F. R. Palmer - 1988 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 50 (4):728-729.details
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Philosophy of Language.Scott Soames - 2010 - Princeton University Press.details
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Modality and language.Kai Von Fintel - 2005 - In Donald M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. macmillan reference. pp. 20-27.details
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Implicating Questions.David Braun - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (5):574-595.details
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A Flexible Contextualist Account of Epistemic Modals.Janice Dowell, J. L. - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11:1-25.details
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(2 other versions)Epistemic Modals in Context.Andy Egan, John Hawthorne & Brian Weatherson - 2005 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in philosophy: knowledge, meaning, and truth. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 131-170.details
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(1 other version)Philosophical Essays: Natural Language: What It Means and How We Use It.Scott Soames - 2009 - Princeton University Press.details
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Observations on embedding verbs, evidentiality, and presupposition.Mandy Simons - 2007details
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Epistemic modality and truth conditions.Anna Papafragou - unknowndetails
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How not to theorize about the language of subjective uncertainty.Eric Swanson - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Perspectives on possibilities: contextualism, relativism, or what?Kent Bach - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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On Quantifier Domain Restriction.Jason Stanley & Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (2-3):219--61.details
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Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.details
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Indexicality and deixis.Geoffrey Nunberg - 1993 - Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (1):1--43.details
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What 'must' and 'can' must and can mean.Angelika Kratzer - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.details
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Relativism about truth itself: Haphazard thoughts about the very idea.Crispin Wright - 2008 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative truth. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 157.details
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Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):1--22.details
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Context ex Machina.Kent Bach - 2004 - In Zoltán Gendler Szabó (ed.), Semantics Versus Pragmatics. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 15--44.details
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Speaking loosely: Sentence nonliterality.Kent Bach - 2001 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):249–263.details
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(1 other version)A puzzle about belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.details
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(1 other version)An Opinionated Guide to Epistemic Modality.Kai von Fintel & Anthony Gillies - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:32-62.details
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(1 other version)An Opinionated Guide to Epistemic Modality.Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies - 2007 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology:Volume 2: Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 32-62.details
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(1 other version)Sufficiency and Excess.Lloyd Humberstone - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):265-320.details
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(1 other version)Sufficiency and Exess.Lloyd Humberstone & Herman Cappelen - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80:265-320.details
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(2 other versions)Epistemic Modals in Context.Andy Egan, John Hawthorne & Brian Weatherson - 2005 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in philosophy: knowledge, meaning, and truth. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism.Herman Cappelen & Ernest Lepore - 2005 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by Ernest LePore.details
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Epistemic Modality.Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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'Might' Made Right.Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 108–130.details
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Nonfactualism about epistemic modality.Seth Yalcin - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Judge dependence, epistemic modals, and predicates of personal taste.Tamina Stephenson - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (4):487--525.details
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New Age Relativism and Epistemic Possibility: The Question of Evidence.Crispin Wright - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):262--283.details
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Replies. [REVIEW]Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):469–492.details
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Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal taste.Peter Lasersohn - 2005 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (6):643--686.details
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You Don't Say?Kent Bach - 2001 - Synthese 128 (1-2):15-44.details
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CIA leaks.Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (1):77-98.details
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Epistemic modals are assessment-sensitive.John MacFarlane - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Acknowledgments.Scott Soames - 2010 - In Philosophy of Language. Princeton University Press.details
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Does 'probably' modify sense?Huw Price - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):396 – 408.details
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Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism.Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (1):1-26.details
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Book Review:Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [REVIEW]Leonard Linsky - 1970 - Ethics 80 (4):322-.details
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Why incomplete definite descriptions do not defeat Russell's theory of descriptions.Scott Soames - 2005 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):7-30.details
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